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ABSTRACT
A NEW LOOK AT THE ‘OLD VIEW’: ENDOGENOUS DISCOUNTING,
TAXATION, AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL DECISIONS
By
ROBERT D. BUSCHMAN
AUGUST 2012
Committee Chair: Dr. James Alm
Major Department: Economics
The theoretical debate over the effect of dividend taxation on corporate decisions
is long-running and unsettled, and was central to the debate and passage of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA). It is a critical issue again as
the expiration of JGTRRA tax rates looms at the end of 2012.
This dissertation proposes an enhanced “old view” theoretical model of dividend
taxation, using endogenous discounting methodology of Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld
(1990) to relate dividend policy, taxes, and investment. In addition to the standard old
view condition for optimal investment, an Euler equation for optimal dividend policy is
derived. Optimal dividends and investment are both shown to vary negatively with
dividend tax rates, ceteris paribus, whereas competing “new view” and agency theories
conclude no such dependence.
Predictions from the theory are tested using a pooled panel of U.S. firms covering
a period, 1994-2009, that includes two relevant tax changes: the 1997 cut in federal
capital gains tax rates and, in 2003, the JGTRRA cuts in the top dividend tax rate from
39.6 to 15 percent and in the top capital gains rate from 20 to 15 percent. Existing
empirical studies of the effect of dividend taxation on firm behavior, including a limited
xi

body of work on the 2003 tax changes, are improved upon by use of a Tobit regression
model to properly address the “excess zeroes” problem of more than 45 percent of firms,
on average over the period, not paying dividends. In addition, while the existing
literature generally omits firm investment as an explanatory variable in dividend models,
theory suggests dividend and investment decisions may be linked. Thus firm investment
is included, but is treated as an endogenous variable, instrumented by exogenous or
predetermined aggregate and firm-specific variables.
Empirical results are consistent with predictions of the old view, showing a
positive effect of the JGTRRA dividend tax cut on both payouts and investment, and
suggesting that the expiration of JGTRRA could be expected to reduce payouts and
investment. Point estimates of the effects of JGTRRA on public companies’ dividend
payouts relative to assets are statistically significant and large compared to average
annual payouts since 1994. Estimates also suggest an increase in firm investment of
about 5-6 percent from pre-JGTRRA levels, ceteris paribus.

xii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“It dramatically reduces the tax on dividends and investment. This will
have a profoundly positive effect on job creation, corporate accountability,
and the well-being of all Americans.” – U.S. Treasury Secretary
John Snow, May 23, 2003

The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, signed into law in
May 2003, made sharp cuts to the personal income tax rates applicable to dividend
income in the United States, greatly reducing the double taxation of corporate source
income and the discrimination in the tax system against dividend income and in favor of
capital gains. The proponents of the 2003 act argued that the double taxation of corporate
income, together with tax discrimination against dividends and equity finance, distorts
corporate financial decisions, raises capital costs, and discourages productive investment.
The act was proposed and passed with the objectives of encouraging both business
investment and the increased payment of dividends – objectives that under some theories
of corporate dividend decisions would seem to be in conflict.
The theoretical debate over how firms set dividend policy, especially in the face
of changes to the tax treatment of dividends, is long-running and passage of the 2003 tax
changes presented an opportunity to test the theories and whether the bill was having the
promised effects. The economic literature around the law’s effects is varied, some
focusing on estimating stock price effects of the tax changes or what those prices changes
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imply about the cost of capital, some on whether firms responded by switching from
share repurchases to special dividends as a means or distributing cash to shareholders,
and some on whether the frequency of dividend initiations or increases changed after
passage. Few have looked at the effects on dividend payouts directly, most settling for
modeling binary decisions to pay a dividend or not, to increase it or not, etc.; few have
looked at the act’s effects on business investment; and few have looked at the effects over
a long time period, over complete business cycles. This dissertation will model dividend
payments directly, rather than binary choices, using a panel of U.S. firms with data
spanning 16 years and two business cycles, and will also model corporate investment and
the interdependence between dividends and investment.
Testing the theories of dividends and their taxation also affords an opportunity to
explore the theory. As noted above, there is much disagreement over the theoretical
effects of dividend taxation on firm behavior, with different predictions arising from the
so-called old and new views of dividend taxation, and from more recent agency theories.
There is also some inconsistency in the theoretical literature in the modeling of the firm
decision, so this dissertation will use a consistent framework to model some of the
competing theories, and compare their assumptions and predictions. The application of a
dynamic optimization model that incorporates an endogenous discount rate results in a
somewhat enhanced version of the old view model, including the derivation of an Euler
equation for the optimal dividend policy in addition to the usual condition for optimal
investment.
Further analysis of the effects of the 2003 act is warranted and timely not only as
an academic exercise. The present policy with regard to dividend and capital gains
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taxation is set to expire at the end of this year, 2012, along with the expiration of all of
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts that had been extended as recently as December 2010. These
expiring tax policies are a large part of what some have recently taken to referring to as
an approaching “fiscal cliff.” Hopefully, this project will contribute in some way to the
analysis and debate over how corporate source income should be taxed in the future.
The dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter II will provide some historical
perspective and an overview of current tax policy with regard to capital income in the
U.S., with comparisons to other major economies. Chapter III will offer some
preliminary empirical observations on dividend policies of U.S. firms over time, and will
review and highlight some recent survey evidence on firms’ dividend policies. Chapters
IV and V delve into the theory, first with background on the old view – new view debate
and alternate theories, and next with the formal theoretical models. The next three
chapters review the empirical literature, describe the data and some key empirical issues,
present the main hypotheses and lesser predictions to be tested, and outline the
econometric methods and present results. Chapter IX concludes.
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CHAPTER II
TAXATION OF CORPORATE SOURCE PERSONAL INCOME
IN THE UNITED STATES
Policy History in Brief
Over the history of income taxation in the United States since 1913, dividend
income was fully exempt from individual income taxes through 1953, with the exception
of four years from 1936 through 1939 during which dividends were fully taxable. From
1954 through 1985, dividend income was taxable as ordinary income, but small amounts
were excluded from taxation.1 The exclusion was repealed as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (“TRA86”), which also reduced the top marginal tax rate on dividend income
from 50 percent to 28 percent, and dividends remained fully taxable at ordinary income
tax rates until 2003 (Joint Committee on Taxation 1981, 1987; Tax Foundation 2006).
In the first 73 years of individual income taxation in the U.S., some 20 acts of
Congress changed some aspect of capital gains taxation, including changes in applicable
rates, exclusions, and holding period requirements for “long-term” gains treatment
(Esenwein 2007). Prior to passage of TRA86, 60 percent of net long-term capital gains
were excluding from taxable income, resulting in an effective top marginal tax rate of 20
percent. TRA86 repealed this exclusion, bringing the top capital gains tax rate to the
same 28 percent top rate applicable to ordinary income and dividends. Since 1986,

1

The first $50 was excluded through 1963, increasing to $100 per filer each year through 1985, with the
exception of 1981 when there was a combined $200 ($400 joint) interest and dividend income exclusion.
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significant changes with regard to long-term capital gains (i.e. on assets held for more
than one year) include two cuts in statutory rates from the TRA86 top rate of 28 percent
to 20 percent in May 1997, under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, and 15 percent
effective May 6, 2003.2
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
President George W. Bush first proposed changes to dividend and capital gains
taxation on January 7, 2003 as part of his “Jobs and Growth” initiative to stimulate the
U.S. economy, which was in the midst of a sluggish recovery from the 2001 recession.
According to then chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Glenn Hubbard,
business investment was the “weak spot” of the economic recovery in 2002, falling by
2.0 percent in the first three quarters of recovery, he said, when one would typically see
an increase of “roughly 2.7 percent”. As proposed, the changes would have represented a
full integration of corporate and personal taxes on corporate source income. Dividends
would no longer be taxed at the individual level and taxpayers would receive a step-up in
basis for retained earnings taxed at the corporate level. The objective, according to
Hubbard, was to stimulate business investment and thus boost the economy:
The most immediate effect of ending the double taxation of corporate
income will be to lower the cost of capital faced by firms in equity
markets… Corporate income will be taxed once – and only once – which
will make corporate equities more attractive to investors and lower the
implicit cost that firms pay for equity-financed investment.

2

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 set the maximum rate on assets held more than 18 months at 20 percent
and left the rate on assets held for more than 12 months, but less than 18 months, at 28 percent. However,
the 18 month holding period was repealed in 1998 and the holding period for the 20 percent rate was
reduced to 12 months. It also established a lower, 18 percent maximum rate for assets purchased after
December 31, 2000 and held for more than five years, but this provision was repealed in 2003, before any
gains eligible for the rate could have been realized.
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With regard to dividends in particular, Hubbard added:
In addition to the direct stimulative effects of lower costs of equity capital,
ending the double taxation of corporate income will rationalize dividend
payout policy among American companies. This will also aid investment,
even in the short run. Currently, the tax code encourages firms to retain
earnings and remit income to shareholders through share repurchases… A
main goal of the President’s policy is to … [make] tax policy neutral with
respect to retaining earnings or paying dividends. (Joint Economic
Committee 2003)
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA”) was
introduce in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 27, 2003 and passed by the
House on May 9. The Senate passed its version of the bill on May 15, sending the bill to
a conference committee. The final bill was agreed to by both houses on May 23 and the
President signed it on May 28, 2003.
As enacted, the JGTRRA brought about only partial integration of corporate and
personal taxes, reducing but not eliminating the double-taxation of corporate source
income. Under JGTRRA, qualified dividends3 received by taxable individuals beginning
January 1, 2003, are taxed at a maximum rate of 15 percent, the same as the maximum
tax rate on long-term capital gains under JGTRRA. For taxpayers in tax brackets below
the 25 percent marginal rate bracket, the rate applicable to qualified dividends and longterm capital gains was 5 percent through 2007 and zero percent beginning January 1,
2008. Immediately prior to passage of JGTRRA, dividends were taxed as ordinary
income while long-term capital gains were taxed at a maximum rate of 20 percent.

3

“Qualified dividends” are ordinary dividends paid by a U.S. corporation or a qualified foreign corporation
on shares held for more than 60 days during the 121-day period that begins 60 days before the ex-dividend
date. A more complete explanation of these and other qualifications can be found in IRS Publication 550:
Investment Income and Expenses, available online at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p550.pdf.
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In addition to changes in dividend and capital gains taxation, JGTRRA also
accelerated the phased reductions in ordinary income tax rates passed as part of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (“EGTRRA”). EGTRRA
had created a new 10 percent tax bracket, below the 15 percent bracket, for incomes up to
$6,150 for single filers, and provided for phased reductions of rates for brackets above
the 15 percent bracket. For the 2001-2003 tax years, the higher brackets’ tax rates were
each reduced by one percentage point to 27, 30, 35, and 38.6 percent from 28, 31, 36, and
39.6 percent, respectively. Further reductions were scheduled to take effect in 2004 and
2006; JGTRRA made the 2006 rates effective beginning January 1, 2003.
As originally passed, all of the tax rate reductions in EGTRRA were set to expire
January 1, 2011 and the dividend and capital gains rate reductions in JGTRRA were set
to expire January 1, 2009. In 2005, the latter were extended through 2010, and in late
2010, the EGTRRA and JGTRRA income tax cuts were again extended through 2012.
On January 1, 2013, absent new legislation, ordinary income, dividend, and capital gains
tax rates will return to the levels in effect prior to passage of EGTRRA and JGTRRA.
The top rate on ordinary income and on dividends will be 39.6 percent, while the top rate
applicable to long-term capital gains will be 20 percent.
Policy in Other OECD Nations
Among the 33 OECD member nations other than the United States, the GDPweighted average of the top personal income tax rates on dividend income, inclusive of
sub-national income taxes and net of any imputation or other credits, was 21.4 percent in
2011. For the U.S., the top federal rate plus the weighted average of state tax rates on
dividend income came to 21.2 percent, ranking the U.S. 16th out of 34. In 2000, before
7

either the EGTRRA or the JGTRRA tax cuts, the comparable U.S. top dividend tax rate
was 46.2 percent, well above the 28.9 percent OECD weighted average and ranking it
second among OECD nations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2011; Carroll and Prante 2012).
However, personal tax rates are only a partial measure of the total statutory tax
rate on corporate profit distributions. In the U.S. and all other OECD nations, profits are
taxed first at the corporate level, on which tax rate the U.S. currently ranks first – second
in 2011, before Japan lowered its corporate tax rate. A more complete measure – one that
enables comparison across nations – requires integrating the two levels of taxes. In the
U.S., $1 of pretax corporate earnings is first subjected to federal and average local taxes
at a combined rate of about 39.2 percent, leaving 60.8 cents in after-tax earnings. If
distributed to shareholders as qualified dividends, these earnings are subjected to federal
and (average) state personal income taxes at, according to OECD calculations, a 21.2
percent combined top rate. Together, corporate and personal taxes at the top statutory
rates would absorb about 52.1 cents of the $1 of pretax profits.
This 52.1 percent integrated top dividend tax rate in the U.S. in 2011 compares to
a GDP-weighted average of 44.5 percent for non-U.S. OECD countries (Carroll and
Prante 2012) and ranks the U.S. fourth out of 34 nations, lower than only the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and France. In 2000, the combined rate in the U.S. was 67.3 percent
by OECD calculations, comparing unfavorably to a non-U.S. weighted average integrated
dividend tax rate of 54.8 percent and ranking second among OECD nations behind the
Netherlands.

8

The U.S. clearly wasn’t alone among OECD nations in cutting personal tax rates
on dividend income over the period. In fact, 17 of the 33 other OECD nations cut their
top personal dividend tax rate from 2000 to 2011, while eight raised the top rate and eight
others left it unchanged. On an integrated basis, 29 of the 33 non-U.S. OECD countries
reduced overall taxation of corporate profit distributions. 30 of 33 cut corporate tax rates.
Carroll and Prante (2012) make a similar comparison of top long-term capital
gains tax rates in OECD countries based on country-specific analyses conducted by
accounting firm Ernst & Young. According to their data, the non-U.S. weighted average
tax rate is 17.8 percent, including national and sub-national individual income taxes, and
countries were split between raising or lowering capital gains taxes, or leaving them
unchanged. Nine raised, 12 lowered (including the U.S.), and 13 left rates unchanged
between 2000 and 2011. However, holding periods and other conditions for preferential,
long-term gains rates (where preferential treatment exists) vary widely, so comparisons
are sometimes difficult. In addition, calculation of the integrated capital gains tax rate,
which includes the effect of corporate tax as well, assumes that after tax corporate profits
become realized gains for shareholders in the same year, distributed in the form of share
repurchases or otherwise. Nevertheless, by the authors’ analysis, the U.S. also ranks
fourth among OECD nations in terms of integrated capital gains tax rates.
What’s Next for U.S. Policy?
As noted above, the personal income tax provisions of the EGTRRA and
JGTRRA are now scheduled to expire at the end of 2012, with dividend tax rates
returning to ordinary income tax rates, and rates on ordinary income and capital gains
returning to levels in effect before passage of EGTRRA in 2001. The top federal tax rate
9

on dividends and ordinary income, beginning January 1, 2013, will be 39.6 percent, and
the top rate on long-term capital gains will be 20 percent.
In addition, investment income of many taxpayers will be subject to a new 3.8
percent Medicare tax under current law. This tax will apply to the net “unearned”
income, including dividends and capital gains (short- or long-term), to the extent that a
single filer’s adjusted gross income exceeds $200,000 or married filers’ joint adjusted
gross income exceeds $250,000. Filers in the top marginal rate bracket, and many or most
in the second highest rate bracket, will be subject to this tax on investment income.
Including the new medicare tax as well as average state taxes, the top personal
income tax rate on dividend income in the U.S. will rise to 48.3 percent in 2013,
according to Carroll and Prante. The top integrated tax rate on dividends, including
corporate income taxes, will be 68.6 percent. Absent changes in other OECD countries
from 2011 rates, these dividend tax rates would rank the U.S. first in the OECD,
surpassing the next highest personal tax rate (Denmark) by 8.3 percentage points and the
next highest integrated rate (France) by 10.8 percentage points. Top personal and
integrated tax rates on long-term capital gains would rise to 28.7 percent and 56.7
percent, respectively, ranking the U.S. fourth in personal capital gains tax rates and first
on an integrated basis among OECD nations.
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CHAPTER III
FIRM BEHAVIOR: OBSERVATIONS AND SURVEY EVIDENCE

Before delving into the theory of how the tax changes discussed in the last chapter
might affect corporate behavior, it is worth considering what firms and their managers do
and say with regard to dividend payments and related decisions. In this chapter, we first
observe payout policies of U.S. firms from data on firms in broad stock market indices
published by the Standard and Poors Corporation (“S&P”), and how payout policies
changed as tax structures changed in recent decades. Observations on how dividend
payments relate to firm earnings and capital expenditures are also presented, followed by
a review of some recent survey evidence as to how firm managers view and make
decisions about payment dividends.
Dividend Payers and Payments
Trends in firms’ dividend policies since 1980 can be seen in Figure 1, which
shows the percentage of firms in the S&P 500® stock index that pay a regular dividend as
well as the annual real dividend rate in 2011 U.S. dollars. From 1980 through 2001,
dividend payers declined from about 94 percent of the large capitalization firms in the
S&P 500 to 70 percent. The decline was interrupted for a few years after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 reduced the top marginal tax rate on dividend income and increased the top
rate on capital gains, but the decline in dividend payers accelerated in the late 1990s
through 2001.
11

Figure 1. S&P 500 Percent of Firms Paying Regular Dividends and Annualized
Real Dividend Rate, by calendar year.
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Sources: Standard & Poors, NBER, BLS, and author's calculations

Over the same period, the “per share” dividend on the S&P 500 grew slowly on
an inflation-adjusted basis. Measuring from the 1982 to the 2001 recession lows, average
annual real growth in S&P 500 dividends was only about 1.15 percent. Trough-to-trough
real dividend growth from the 2001 recession to the latest, much deeper one was much
higher at 2.04 percent. Measuring from recession lows to expansion peaks, 1982-1999
dividend growth averaged 2.01 percent per annum while 2001-2007 growth averaged
7.04 percent.
The S&P 500, however, consists of only large capitalization stocks, but we find a
similar pattern in the broader S&P 1500® index over the 1994-2011 period shown in
Figure 2. The S&P 1500 is a composite index comprised of the S&P 500, the S&P
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Midcap 400®, and the S&P Smallcap 600®, which accounts for more than 90 percent of
the total market capitalization of U.S. publicly traded firms.4
Figure 2. S&P 1500 Percent of Firms Paying Regular Dividends and Annualized
Real Dividend Rate, by quarter.
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The percent of firms in the S&P 1500 paying a regular dividend was about 65
percent each year until a sharp fall-off began in 1997-1998, after which the percentage
fell to below 54 percent for all of 2002. By the second quarter of 2005, dividend payers
again accounted for more than 60 percent of S&P 1500 firms. With the recent deep
recession, the share of payers fell back again to near 2002 levels, but has since returned to
over 60 percent. Real dividends on the S&P 1500 also showed a similar pattern to the

4

The S&P Midcap 400 and Smallcap 600 are presently comprised, respectively, of firms with market
capitalizations of between about $1 billion and $4.4 billion, and between $300 million and $1.4 billion.
The float-adjusted total market capitalization of S&P 1500 firms was approximately $14.1 trillion as of
April 20, 2012, accounting for about 92 percent of the $15.3 trillion capitalization of the S&P Total Market
Index, which includes the common equities of all U.S. firms listed on the NYSE (including NYSE Arca
and NYSE Amex) and the NASDAQ stock market. The S&P 1500 has been published since 1994,
beginning after the S&P 600 index was created. See http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/main/en/us
for further information.
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S&P 500, being essentially flat from 1995 through the 2001 recession (ignoring the 2001
fourth quarter dip) and into 2003 before rising sharply through late 2007, by almost 9
percent per annum.
Firms initiating or increasing regular dividend payments tell a similar story of a
change in behavior beginning in 2003. Figure 3 shows the number of firms in the S&P
1500 initiating or terminating regular dividends payments each quarter from the
December quarter of 1994 through 2011, and Figure 4 shows the number of firms
increasing their regular dividend rate (excluding initiations) over the same period.
Figure 3. Initiations and Terminations of Regular Dividends by S&P 1500 Firms,
by quarter.
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Through December 2000, S&P 1500 firms averaged about 1.4 net terminations
per quarter (2.4 initiations and 3.8 terminations per quarter, on average), while from midyear 2003 through the end of 2007 the average was about 4.8 net initiations per quarter
(8.4 initiations and 3.6 terminations per quarter). The first two years after passage of
JGTRRA saw average net initiations of more than 10.2 per quarter. The recent recession
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favored terminations, as one might expect, but over the last two years, 2010-2011,
initiations again far outpaced terminations by 8.5 net initiations per quarter. The pattern
of firms increasing or decreasing dividends is similar, though less visually obvious.
Through 2000, 120 more firms, on average, increased than decreased dividends each
quarter; from mid-year 2003 through mid-year 2008, there were 148 more dividend
increases than decreases each quarter. The recession resulted in a relatively large number
of dividend cuts, particularly toward the end of the recession, but the pace of net
increases has averaged 149 firms per quarter over the latest five quarters.
Figure 4. Increases and Decreases of Regular Dividends by S&P 1500 Firms,
by quarter.
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Sources: Compustat, NBER, and author's calculations.

Dividends, Earnings, and Investment
Representing the distribution of corporate profits to shareholders, dividends
reduce the internally generated financial resources available for reinvestment in new
productive capital – in accounting terms, capital expenditures. As such, one might expect
to find certain relationships among these variables, with dividends positively related to
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profits and negatively related to capital expenditures. In addition, there may be reason to
expect dividends to be relatively more volatile than earnings if, as some theorists suggest,
dividends are paid as a residual, after all profitable investment opportunities have been
funded. Figure 5 shows trends in real dividends and earnings per share for the S&P 1500
since 1995; while there is clearly a positive correlation, dividends appear to be
considerably more stable in the aggregate than earnings. During expansion periods,
dividends rose much more slowly than earnings and during the latest recession, dividends
peaked about a year after earnings began to decline and then declined by only 24 percent
in real terms compared to a 94 percent decline in real earnings.
Figure 5. S&P 1500 Real Dividends and Earnings, trailing 12-months by quarter.
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Figure 6 presents the same dividend and earnings data as a scatter plot, with black
and red dots representing, respectively, periods before and after passage of JGTRRA.
Red arrows connect the periods from the third quarter of 2007, just before the latest
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recession, to the first quarter of the recovery, the third quarter of 2009. Excluding those
quarters, the relationship between earnings and dividends seems clear; a simple linear
regression suggests that an additional $1 of real earnings would increase real dividends
by about 9 cents (significant at the 1 percent level). A much longer monthly series on
S&P 500 real dividends and earnings, going back to 1871, yields an estimate of 30 cents
of dividends for the marginal dollar of earnings.5
Figure 6. S&P 1500 Real Dividends vs. Real Earnings.
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Figure 7 similarly relates capital expenditures (“CAPEX”) to dividends, though
CAPEX data for the S&P indices are reported only annually and are available only
through yearend 2010. CAPEX and dividends appear to grow and contract similarly over
the business cycle, but unlike dividends, capital expenditures in the post-2001 expansion
never surpassed late-1990s levels on an inflation-adjusted basis. Though they represent

5

The data for this estimate were compiled by Yale University’s Robert Shiller and are available on his
website, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
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alternative or competing uses of firms’ financial resources, any relationship between the
two variables remains unclear.
Figure 7. S&P 1500 Real Dividends and Capital Expenditures.
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Survey Evidence: What Managers Say About Dividend Decisions
Chapter 4 will provide some background on the theoretical debate over dividends
– why firms pay them, the relationship with profits and investment, and the effect of
taxes. First, though, surveys of firm managers might shed some practical light on the
matter. An early survey of dividend policy was conducted by Lintner (1956), who
analyzed seven years (1947-1953) of financial results and practices, and interviewed
managers of 28 established, publicly-traded industrial firms to learn the factors and
priorities affecting their dividend decisions. Lintner found that, without exception, the
first consideration in dividend decisions was the existing dividend rate. Managers
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believed that stockholders put a premium on stability and gradual growth in the dividend
rate, and sought to avoid changes in dividend policy that might soon have to be reversed.
The accompanying empirical analysis found that dividend increases depended primarily
on growth in earnings, but only over time, through a partial adjustment process. Recent
surveys, over much larger samples, find that little has changed since the post-war period.
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) surveyed 384 financial executives
and conducted in-depth interviews with 23 more to find what drives dividend and share
repurchase decisions. A second survey of 328 executives, conducted jointly with CFO
magazine, attempted to determine the effects of the dividend tax cut in JGTRRA on
firms’ payout policies (Brav et al. 2008).
The earlier survey covered 256 public companies along with 128 privately held
ones, and was conducted in April and May of 2002, several months before the tax cuts of
JGTRRA were first proposed. Privately held firms were included in part as a sort of
control group in that they should be less affected than public firms by asymmetric
information and agency issues that theory suggests may motivate dividend payout
decisions (results tended to support this notion). Some key findings of this survey are as
follows:


Very large majorities (84 to 94 percent) of respondents from dividend-paying
public firms said that they try to maintain a consistent dividend policy with a
smooth dividend stream from year to year, and that there are negative
consequences to cutting dividends and they try to avoid doing so.



Large majorities of both dividend-payers and share-repurchasers agreed that their
dividend or repurchase decisions conveyed information about their companies to
investors (80 and 85 percent, respectively).



A 65 percent majority of dividend-payers said that they would raise new, outside
funds to finance investments rather than reducing dividend payouts, but only 16
percent of share-repurchasers would do the same to avoid reducing buybacks.
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Only 33 percent of dividend-payers (79 percent of share-repurchasers) said they
make their dividend (repurchase) decisions only after determining their
investment plans.



Among respondents from the 76 firms that have not paid dividends in the last
three years, the factors most often cited as important or very important
considerations for initiating a dividend are influence of institutional investors, a
sustainable earnings increase, fewer profitable investment opportunities, excess
cash, and as a response to, or a signal to investors about, market undervaluation of
their firm’s shares.
The later survey, conducted in August 2005, covered 152 public firms, of which

106 had paid dividends during the latest three years, and 176 private firms, of which 57
had paid dividends. Brav et al. (2008) found a small to moderate effect of the 2003
dividend tax cut on the decisions of firms that had initiated dividends over three years
prior to the survey. Higher ranking factors for these firms’ decisions to initiate were their
cash flow stability, their cash balances, and their investment opportunities. Among firms
that had paid dividends for all of the last three years, the tax change was far less
important a factor, the most important factor being the historical level of their dividends.
The authors also reviewed 243 news articles and press releases about dividend
initiations over the 2002-2005 period, finding 193 that mentioned one or more reasons for
initiating dividends. 33 of these specifically mentioned the dividend tax cut as a reason
for initiating, with the majority of those mentions coming in the quarter following
passage of JGTRRA. Overall, the authors concluded that while executives consider
personal taxes in making dividend decisions, they are of secondary importance, with little
effect on decisions of firms already paying dividends, but a somewhat greater effect on
firms “sitting on the fence” about whether to initiate dividend payments.
Similar results were found in two surveys of NYSE listed firms in 1983 and 1987,
and of NASDAQ firms in 1999 (Baker and Powell 2000; Baker, Veit, and Powell 2001).
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The pattern of past dividends was the highest ranked factor influencing dividend policy
among the NASDAQ firms, followed by stability of earnings, and the levels of current
and expected future earnings. Among NYSE firms, the top ranked factor in both survey
years was the level of current and expected future earnings, followed by the pattern of
past dividends and concern about maintaining or increasing the stock price.
The survey evidence can be summarized by the following stylized facts about
dividend decisions of firms:


Firm managers generally believe there are negative consequences to cutting
dividends (but not necessarily to cutting share repurchases) and try to avoid doing
so, instead attempting to maintain a smooth dividend stream from year to year.



Managers believe their dividend (and repurchase) decisions convey signals to
investors about their companies.



Most managers disagree that their dividend decisions are made only after
investment decisions.



Most managers agree they would raise new outside funds to finance investment
rather than cutting dividends (but not to avoid cutting repurchases).



The most often cited reason for initiating or increasing dividends is sustainable
earnings growth. Cash balances and investment opportunities are the next most
important factors.
As we delve into the theory in the coming chapters, keep in mind that the survey

evidence does not support the conclusion of some theoretical models that dividends are a
residual payment. However, the availability of profitable investment opportunities is,
according to managers, a leading factor in firms’ decisions as to initiating or increasing
dividends, suggesting simultaneous or interdependent choices. The survey evidence is
also consistent with the assumption in some models of the signaling value of dividends.
In other words, changes in dividend policy can change investor perceptions of firm
prospects and risks, and this investor sentiment is reflected in their return requirements.
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CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
While managers’ views on the importance of dividend policy are fairly clear and
observable behavior seems to have changed along with changes in tax policy, dividend
policy and the effect of taxes are subjects of long-running theoretical debate. Miller and
Modigliani (1961) showed that, given the firm’s capital budget and assuming perfect
capital markets, dividend policy is irrelevant with regard to the value of the firm.
Distortionary taxes, however, are a market imperfection, presenting a problem for their
theorem that can only be partially mitigated by tax “clientele” effects, as they
acknowledge. The perfect markets assumption also implies perfect information, and
Miller and Modigliani also acknowledged the potential “information content” of
dividends. Black (1976) and Miller (1982) discuss how, in a world of informational
asymmetries and rational expectations, information conveyed by changes in dividend
policy can affect firm value, but the puzzle of why firms pay dividends at all remains,
especially given tax discrimination against dividend payouts. A related problem for the
dividend irrelevance theorem is the potential principal-agent conflict between
shareholders and management, suggesting a possible basis for investors valuing
dividends in some circumstances in spite of the tax consequences.
The theory of why firms pay dividends, and how taxation affects the financial and
real decisions of firms remains unsettled. This chapter summarizes the competing
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theories, and briefly touches on related theory about financial structure and the
interdependence between real and financial decisions. The next chapter will formalize
three alternate theories of dividend taxation within a consistent mathematical framework
and derive hypotheses for empirical testing.
Competing Neoclassical Theories of Dividend Taxation
Two competing views of the effects of dividend taxation, the so-called old and
new views, are based on the neoclassical model of firm investment, following and
building upon Jorgensen’s optimization theory (Jorgensen 1963; Hall and Jorgensen
1967). The debate has its roots in King(1974), who showed that the firm’s cost of capital
depends on the source of funds for investment. Auerbach (1979, 1983) and Bradford
(1981) further developed the model into the new view, or more descriptively the “tax
capitalization” or “trapped equity” view of dividend taxation. Under this view, marginal
investment is funded out of retained earnings, if they are sufficient, implying that
dividends are paid only as a residual, after all marginally profitable investment
opportunities are funded. Auerbach (1979) concludes that “the appropriate cost of capital
… does not depend directly on either the dividend payout rate or the tax on dividends”,
and thus dividend taxes would not affect investment. Furthermore, since firms pay
dividends only from residual profits after funding all marginal investment opportunities,
neither would dividend taxes affect payout policy. Bradford reaches essentially the same
conclusion, and argues that any change in the taxation of dividends is merely capitalized
into the price of the stock, representing a windfall gain or loss in wealth to shareholders
at the time of the change, but having no effect on investment or payout choices of the
firm.
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Poterba and Summers (1983, 1985) argue that the new view is unable to explain
the payment of dividends in the presence of a tax penalty for doing so. In particular, if
firms are able to repurchase stock, they should never pay dividends in a classical tax
system of taxing dividends more heavily than capital gains. Furthermore, firms should
never issue new shares while also paying dividends. Yet several authors have observed
that firms often pay dividends while also issuing new equity (Poterba and Summers 1983;
Easterbrook 1984; Zodrow 1991; Bond and Meghir 1994; Gordon and Dietz 2006). In
addition, since the new view holds that dividends are a residual payment, it would follow
that exogenous changes that make investment more desirable should lead to a fall in
dividends and that dividends should be relatively more volatile than profits as a result.
Again, however, the literature suggests that dividend payments are both less volatile than
firm profits and positively related to subsequent investment spending (Lintner 1956;
Feldstein and Green 1983; Poterba and Summers 1983, 1985; Zodrow 1991).
The old (or “traditional”) view, on the other hand, holds that shareholders derive
benefits from the payment of dividends in addition to the payment itself. These may be
signaling benefits (Bhattacharya 1979; Poterba and Summers 1983) or a means of
shareholders limiting the discretion of management to invest in low-return projects by
reducing cash balances under management control (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986).
Feldstein and Green, however, offer a simple model of a two-company economy with
two investor types (taxable households and non-taxable institutions, both risk averse) in
which dividends are paid in equilibrium without assuming signaling or similar benefits,
or restrictions on repurchases. Feldstein and Green’s result is due, instead, to the model’s
assumptions of heterogeneous tax rates, risk averse investors, and uncertainty.
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Regardless of the mechanism, the notion of some optimal payout policy that minimizes
the cost of equity capital is consistent with earlier empirical observation of payout
behavior as following a dynamic adjustment process, responding to volatile earnings that
cause payouts to differ from some target payout policy based on longer-term trend
earnings (Lintner 1956; Feldstein 1970).
The principle difference between the old and new views, however, lies in the
presumption of each as to the marginal source of investment finance. The new view
argues that mature firms fund the marginal investment from earnings retentions and then
pays dividends with any surplus. Sinn (1991a, 1991b) extends this view, developing a
“nucleus” theory that lays out the stages of firm development whereby firms are initially
capitalized with new equity, followed by a period of purely internally funded growth and
then a mature stage. In the internal growth phase, firms would not pay dividends,
repurchase stock, or issue new equity. Once the firm accumulates sufficient retained
equity capital so that the return on the marginal investment equals the cost of capital (the
market interest rate), the second phase terminates and the firm begins distributing
residual earnings to shareholders. Firms may use debt, but the level of debt is taken as
given and must be repaid from retentions in any event, so the conclusion that dividend
paying firms fund the marginal investment from retained earnings remains. Sinn (1991a)
acknowledges that dividend taxes have a distorting effect in the initial capitalization
phase, reducing firms’ starting stocks of capital and consequently slowing or lengthening
the internal growth phase. However, he argues that subsequent changes in personal taxes
on dividends have no effect on firm behavior because, again, they are merely capitalized
into the price of existing shares.
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The old view, on the other hand, argues that the marginal source of investment
finance is effectively new equity at all stages, whether immediately through new share
issuance or from reductions in stock repurchases. The use of debt, according to this view,
is a temporary substitute for new equity and must be repaid from future stock issuance or
through reductions in stock repurchases, again effectively operating at the new equity
margin. Under the old view, the cost of new equity is positively related to dividend
taxes, with the effect of changes proportional to the payout ratio, dividends over earnings
(Poterba and Summers 1985; Zodrow 1991).
Alternate Theories
Tax Irrelevance / Tax Clienteles
According to the tax irrelevance view originally proposed by Miller and
Modigliani (1961), and developed by Miller and Scholes(1978), the dividend policy of
the firm and the tax rate on dividends do not affect the cost of capital because the
marginal investor in dividend-paying equity securities faces an effective tax rate of zero.
Explanations include that the marginal investor is:


a tax exempt entity (e.g. a pension fund, 401k, or IRA);



able to offset dividend income against investment interest expense, which is not
deductible except against investment income; or



able to arbitrage away dividend tax liability in the market so that dividend income
is realized by non-taxable investors or institutional investors who are indifferent
between dividends and gains because they are taxed at the same rate.
Put simply, the “clientele” for shares of dividend paying firms is not subject to

dividend taxation. Some theoretical support for the notion of tax clienteles comes from
the Feldstein and Green (1983) model of heterogenous firms and investors, where firms
optimally specialize as dividend payers or non-payers with investors also specializing
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according to their tax status. This leads to a corner solution resulting in the collection of
no dividend taxes. However, Feldstein and Green caution that such a corner solution may
not hold if investors hold heterogeneous expectations of firm prospects and is, in any
case, inconsistent with the observed behavior of firms and investors.
In addition, while it is certainly true that the avoidance explanations above hold
for some portion of investors, the evidence suggests they do not hold generally. Gale
(2002) estimates that, since at least 1982, roughly half of corporate dividends (about $93
billion in 2000) face individual income taxation. More recently, according to IRS Tax
Stats data, an estimated 32.0 million personal income tax returns reported a total of
$237.1 billion of dividend income for 2007, prior to the recent recession. Of these
amounts, 27.7 million taxable returns accounted for $226.6 billion of dividends in 2007
(IRS).

Agency Theory
Chetty and Saez (2007, 2010) offer an alternate theory of firm payout behavior
based on the agency theory of the firm, under which management’s objective function
includes possible private benefit from their authority over firm resources, thus
misaligning management and shareholder interests. The Chetty and Saez agency model
is built on the same neoclassical foundation as the old and new views, but takes into
account this principal-agent conflict between shareholders and management, and
introduces monitoring mechanisms and incentives used to align interests, resulting in an
alternate set of predictions as to firm behavior. Shareholders bear monitoring costs to
ensure that management is acting in their interests, while small shareholders have an
incentive to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of larger ones. Boards of directors’
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oversight, incentive features of management contracts, and direct share ownership by
management serve to better align management and shareholder interests under the agency
model.
The key result of interest here is that only “cash-rich” firms with sufficient
monitoring and management incentives to align the interests of management and
investors would pay dividends. However, changes in dividend taxation would affect both
the threshold for what is sufficiently cash-rich to initiate dividend payments (i.e. in
response to a dividend tax cut) and the amount of dividends paid by existing payers. In
addition, the model predicts that changes in dividend taxes can affect investment
decisions, though offsetting changes in private benefit activities of agents likely obscures
the effect in firm data. Finally, Chetty and Saez also show that, according to their model,
the effects of a dividend tax change should be positively related to the degree of
monitoring/incentive effort. In particular, greater management or board ownership
should lead to a greater increase (decrease) in dividends of “cash-rich” firms in response
to a dividend tax cut (increase).
Another approach to explaining positive dividends in the face of discriminatory
taxation also exploits the potential principal-agent conflict. Bond, Devereux, and Klemm
(2007) hypothesize that increased monitoring and scrutiny by financial market
participants, resulting from firms’ accessing the markets for new financing, leads to
“control benefits” in the form of higher returning investment projects than might be made
absent the need to access external financing. Their model provides a possible explanation
for firms simultaneously paying dividends and issuing new equity, and also predicts an
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effect on firm investment from changes in dividend taxes, but is unable to predict the
dividend payment response to dividend tax changes.
Other Theoretical Issues
Another relevant aspect of firm theory centers on the relationship or
interdependence between firms’ real and financial decisions. Hayashi (1985) offers a
theoretical model based on Tobin’s “q” theory of firm investment that links the
investment and financial structure decisions of the firm. Tobin’s marginal “q” is the
contribution to firm value of a marginal dollar of investment and theoretically determines
the optimal level of investment for the firm. Hayashi’s model describes three investment
financing regimes, differentiated by the relative size of profits and investment, which lead
to different funding mixes of debt, retained equity, and new equity. Optimal debt policy
is a function of the debt tax shield, which depends on tax rates, profits, bankruptcy costs,
and bankruptcy risk. Hayashi assumes profits and bankruptcy costs to be proportional to
the capital stock, with bankruptcy risk proportional to the debt-to-capital ratio. Two of
the resulting regimes finance investment with debt and either new or retained equity,
depending on the regime, in constant (though different) proportions of investment
finance. The third results in funding the marginal investment entirely with debt. Only in
the case of the debt and retained equity funding mix does the firm pay dividends and the
optimal level of investment in that case is partially a function of the dividend tax rate.
Gourio and Miao (2007) also develop a neoclassical model of investment and
financial policy, deriving theoretical responses of each to temporary or permanent
dividend tax changes. The investment and financial policy effects of both, in their model,
are limited to the short run and differ depending on whether the tax change is anticipated.
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Dividend policies and source of equity finance break down into three regimes similar to
those of Hayashi, but with repurchases substituting for dividends to whatever extent
possible whenever capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends. Debt policy in
Gourio and Miao is determined by corporate and personal tax rates such that, as long as
debt finance is treated more favorably for tax purposes, firms will borrow up to some
binding constraint – in this case a collateral constraint where the limit is proportional to
the market value of the firm’s capital. Gourio and Miao, and Hayashi thus raise two
possible approaches to modeling optimal financial policy – the former as a function of tax
rates and the market value of the firm (equity plus debt) relative to asset book values, and
the latter as a function of tax rates and debt-to-capital.
Finally, another paper addressing optimal financial policy (DeAngelo and Masulis
1980) generalizes Miller’s (1977) model, by which he concluded leverage irrelevancy, to
incorporate depreciation/depletion tax benefits and investment tax credits in addition to
corporate and personal taxes. The model demonstrates a unique interior solution of
optimal leverage that is dependent on these tax parameters and leads to testable
predictions about tax effects on leverage decisions. In particular, the use of financial
leverage is decreasing in investment-related tax shields and bankruptcy costs, and
increasing in corporate tax rates, ceteris paribus.
Summary
A shortcoming in the literature on dividend policy and tax effects is that the
competing theories, as presented, are often not consistently derived or easily compared.
Besides matters of form (two-period versus infinite horizon, discrete or continuous time,
etc.), models in the literature differ with regard to at least one critical assumption that
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distinguishes the old view model from all the others. Sinn (1991a) complained that the
Poterba and Summers (1985) old view expression for the cost of equity capital, which
differs from the new view formula in that it is a positive function of the dividend tax rate,
“has never been consistently derived from an optimization approach” and raised “doubts
that it can ever be derived.” This is not entirely true, though.
What Sinn and other new view proponents overlook or ignore in their own
derivations is the assumption in old view models of an effect of dividend policy on
shareholders’ return requirements. Though its validity is certainly debatable, the reason
the dividend tax rate drops out of new view cost of capital derivations is that this
assumption is left out of their models. The shareholders’ required return is treated as
exogenously given and fixed.
One objective of this dissertation is to clarify differences between the theoretical
models buy putting them in the same mathematical framework and highlighting the
differences in key assumptions. The next chapter develops a continuous time model of
the firm’s optimization problem whereby it chooses levels of investment and dividends,
subject to the usual constraints and state equations, to maximize the value of firm shares.
The basic model is consistent in its assumptions and conclusions with the standard new
view model. Simple modifications then produce an infinite horizon analog to the Bond,
Devereux, and Klemm (2007) 2-period monitoring benefits model. Finally, a different
modification to the basic model produces the old view model, following the methods
Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (1990) applied to consumer behavior to introduce a timevarying, endogenously determined discount rate to the firm’s dynamic optimization
problem.
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CHAPTER V
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The framework for the empirical analysis to follow begins with a simple model of
the firm where the manager’s objective is to maximize the value of the firm by choosing
levels of investment and dividends, subject to a budget constraint and other conditions.
The basic model is similar to the neoclassical models proposed by Jorgenson (1967),
King (1974), and others to describe the firm’s optimal investment policy.
The model is easily modified to allow for share issuance or repurchase, and can
also be modified to allow for debt finance as a choice variable and for other assumptions.
Conditions for the payment of dividends, and the issuance or repurchase of stock will be
derived, along with predicted responses in the choice variables to changes in the various
tax parameters and other exogenous factors.
The Basic Model
If the firm’s objective is, as the neoclassical model assumes, to maximize the
value of the firm’s equity, then we must first have an expression for the value of the firm.
As in King(1974), Poterba and Summers(1983), and others, we derive this expression
from a capital markets no arbitrage condition, which says that investors will only hold
shares in the firm if the expected return from holding them at least equals the return on
comparably-risky assets. Equilibrium in the market for shares requires that investors’
risk-adjusted, after-tax required return, ρ, multiplied by the current market value of the
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firm’s equity, Vt, equal the expected future cash returns to equity holders. Cash returns
can take the form of dividends, Dt, or capital gains. Suppressing the expectations
operator,
(

)

(5.1.1)

If share issuance is allowed, then the value at t + 1 includes the value of shares
existing at time t,

, plus the value of new shares issued during the period,

; that is,

Thus, the condition becomes

In the presence of shareholder-level taxes, the dividends and capital gains returns
on the right hand side must be reduced by the applicable taxes, at the rate
payments and at an accrual-equivalent tax rate,
(

)

on dividend

, on capital gains, resulting in

[

](

)

Rearranging, we have
(
Defining
capital gains, and

(

)

(

)

(5.1.2)

), the tax discrimination parameter between dividends and
(

), the after-tax required return grossed up for capital gains

taxes, the value of the firm at time

, in continuous time and an infinite horizon, is

given by
∫

[

]

(5.1.3)

The objective function of the firm is to maximize the current value of the firm’s
equity, V0, choosing dividends and investment, subject to a budget constraint, equations
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of motion for state variables (capital), non-negativity constraints as needed, and
transversality conditions.
Allowing for share issuance (but for simplicity, not debt finance), the budget
constraint takes the form
( )(

)

where ( ) is the firm’s pretax profit function in capital with

and

, and

δ represents the rate of depreciation of capital. The budget constraint equates uses of
funds, dividends and investment, to sources of funds, cash profits after corporate taxes
plus new share issuance. Solving for new share issuance, we have
( )(

)

(5.1.4)

Substituting the right hand side of (1.3) for

in (1.2), the objective function

becomes
∫

[

[

( )(

)

]]

(5.1.5)

subject to
̇

(5.1.6)
(5.1.7)
̅

where ̅

(5.1.8)

, representing a lower bound for share issuance; that is, some negative

number if share repurchases are allowed up to an arbitrary limit or zero if repurchases are
not allowed.
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is
[ ( )(
[ ̅

)

]

( )(

)
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(

)
]

(

)
(5.1.9)

The Lagrangian multiplier q represents the shadow value or marginal benefit of a
one dollar increase in capital (units are such that capital prices are indexed to $1), and is
equivalent to Tobin’s marginal “q”. The multipliers µ on the dividend non-negativity
constraint and γ on the new equity constraint represent, respectively, the marginal value
of relaxing those constraints to allow a dollar of negative dividends or allow a dollar
more of share repurchases.
First order conditions are

(5.1.10)

(5.1.11)
[

(
̇

)
(

]
)

(

[

(

)

]

)[

(

)

]

̇
(5.1.12)

along with
̇

̅

(

̅ )

From equation (1.6) we can see that whenever dividend tax rates are higher than
capital gains rates, then either µ or γ, or both, must be positive and thus the associated
constraint binding. As a result, firms should never pay a dividend while also issuing new
shares or leaving opportunities for share repurchase unexhausted. When optimal
dividends are positive, then

and from equation (1.6),
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, so

is strictly

positive for the dividend-paying firm given

. The firm will not issue new shares

and if repurchases are allowed up to some limit, ̅

, then the constraint (5.1.8) must

be binding; the firm will have exhausted opportunities to repurchase stock before paying
a dividend.
Additionally, for the dividend-paying firm, optimal marginal

, which is less

than unity if dividend tax rates are higher than that on capital gains. The marginal dollar
retained and invested in new capital adds Θ < 1 dollars to the market value of the firm.
An increase in attractive investment opportunities will cause firms to reduce
dividends, if any, first. Only when the non-negativity constraint on dividends binds so
that dividends are zero and

will they reduce repurchases (if ̅

shares to fund the marginal investment. In this case,

,

) or issue new
, and

in

equilibrium.
This can be seen as well through equation (5.1.12), which can be rewritten to
define implicitly the optimal level of capital and thus investment. Substituting q for its
equivalent from equation (5.1.11) and rearranging, we have
̇
(

In steady state, where ̇

)(

)

(

.

)

(5.1.13)

, the marginal return on capital must equal the shareholder

required (after-tax) return, grossed up for corporate income and capital gains taxes. The
firm’s cost of capital relevant to the marginal investment decision is given by the right
hand side of the expression
(

)(

.

)

(5.1.14)

As long as the firm faces unexhausted investment opportunities with marginal returns on
capital in excess of this amount, then the firm would not be paying dividends and would
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be reducing repurchases (and perhaps issuing new shares if the investment opportunities
were large enough) to fund investment.
Note that steady state, in this context, simply means that the firm is in one regime
or the other; that is, paying dividends and financing the marginal investment from
retentions, or issuing shares (or equivalently, not repurchasing the maximum amount of
shares) to finance the marginal investment. Equation (5.1.14) gives the cost of capital for
the equilibrium marginal investment in either case. Only when conditions (e.g. an
increase or decrease in attractive investment opportunities relative to available cash
flows) induce a switch from one regime to the other does ̇

, and then only fleetingly.

By equation (5.1.10), μ and γ can only take on two values, zero or 1 – Θ, unless both
constraints just bind; that is, in the unlikely (and thus uninteresting) event that the optimal
marginal investment is just fully funded by the last dollar of dividend reductions,
reducing them to zero without then reducing repurchases.
Finally, as equation (5.1.14) makes clear, dividend taxation does not enter into the
cost of capital on the marginal investment and thus, changes in dividend taxation do not
affect optimal investment. As a result, because dividends are paid only as a residual,
changes in dividend taxation also do not affect payout policies. The only effect of a
change in dividend tax rates is a wealth effect on current owners of shares, hence the
descriptive name for this view, the tax capitalization view.
These results and conclusions are consistent with those of the tax capitalization or
new view from the literature (Auerbach 1983; Sinn 1991a), but as the third model
presented below will show, they rest critically on the assumption that the discount rate is
exogenously given, that the financial policy of the firm does not affect shareholders’
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required returns. In addition, this view presents some problematic predictions, including
that dividend payments would be relatively more volatile than firm income and
negatively related to investment; and that firms would repeatedly change regimes as their
investment outlook changes or as earnings rise and fall as a result of business cycles or
industry developments. While firms do sometimes suspend dividends to conserve cash in
times of financial stress, empirical literature dating to Feldstein (1970) and Lintner
(1956) shows that dividends tend to adjust only slowly over time in response to changes
in corporate income. In addition, survey evidence (Brav et al. 2005) of financial
executives contradicts the notion that dividends are determined as a residual, suggesting
instead that firms resist reducing dividends to fund new projects (preferring to raise new
funds instead) and that it is repurchases that are determined as a residual, after investment
decisions are made. Finally, I find no evidence in the literature and no legal basis (in the
U.S., at least) for assuming that firms face a binding constraint on share repurchases
before paying dividends (or at all).
A Monitoring Benefits Model
One variation on the basic model (Bond, Devereux, and Klemm 2007) arrives at
an inside solution of positive dividends and positive share issuance by assuming that
accessing external finance subjects firm investment to increased scrutiny and monitoring,
producing “control benefits” that positively affect future profits. To incorporate these
control benefits, Bond, Devereux and Klemm (hereafter “BDK”) include new share
issuance,

, as an argument in the pretax profit function, (

, and

), with

,

. In addition, it is assumed that there is a cost to share issuance

such that net proceeds from new shares equal
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(

), where

. For

simplicity, ̅ is assumed to be zero, assuming away share repurchases. The budget
constraint, solved for dividends, is
(

)(

)

(

)

.

(5.2.1)

Now choosing investment and share issuance, equation (5.2.1) is substituted for
dividends in the objective function and the Hamiltonian, after some algebra to simplify,
becomes
(

)[ (
(

)(

)

(

)

(

)

]

).

(5.2.2)

First order conditions are:
[

(

)

(

](

)

)

(
(

(

)

)

(5.2.3)

)
(5.2.4)

̇

(

)[

(

)

(

)

(

)[

]
(

̇
)

].

(5.2.5)

Assuming first a steady state, inside solution for dividends and share issuance, then
, ̇

, and the first order conditions become
(

)

(5.2.6)
(5.2.7)

and

(

)
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.

(5.2.8)

Equation (5.2.8), solved for

, is the same as (5.1.14) in the base model (giving

the equilibrium marginal cost of capital) except for the assumption in this case that the
marginal return to capital is also a positive function of new share issuance.
Equation (5.2.6) says that the marginal, after corporate tax “control benefit” of
new share issuance must equal the marginal cost of issuing shares plus the marginal tax
penalty of paying dividends. For equation (5.2.6) to hold, given

, requires that

. This is satisfied if dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains so
that

, or if

and

Otherwise, if

.
, then an interior solution requires that f be sufficiently large

to offset the tax advantage (negative tax penalty) of dividends. Also, provided that the
marginal control benefit is strictly positive, the non-negativity constraint on share
issuance will never bind and

will always equal zero.

The actual values of Θ and f determine implicitly the optimal level of new share
issuance,

, which given

will vary negatively with the dividend tax rate,

(positively with Θ), assuming we remain at an interior solution. In addition, since
, then an increase in

and the resulting decrease in

imply lower

for all

levels of K. To maintain the equality in the optimality condition given by equation
(5.2.8) and

, then ̇ and thus

must decrease. Summarizing, a rise in dividend

tax rates implies lower share issuance and lower investment spending for the dividendpaying firm. The effect on dividends depends on whether the effect on share issuance or
on investment is larger.
However, when faced with an exogenous increase in attractive investment
opportunities, all else the same, then the firm would reduce dividends to fund increased
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investment just as under the new view. The optimal level of share issuance would be
unaffected.
When dividends reach zero and thus cannot be reduced further, then
reflects the shadow value of further dividend reductions; that is, of loosening the nonnegativity constraint on dividends. In this financially constrained case, µ enters into the
first-order condition for new share issuance, equation (5.2.6), such that
(

)

.

(5.2.6')

For the financially constrained firm, a positive µ means that the marginal cost on
the right hand side of (5.2.6') is smaller, implying, given

, that optimal share

issuance must rise to restore the equality. Higher share issuance, in turn, implies higher
for all levels of K and thus an increase in optimal investment to maintain the equality
in equation (5.2.8). Note that this optimal investment response by the constrained firm to
new investment opportunities differs from the result in BDK’s two period model in which
the parallel to equation (5.2.8) includes their analogs to both µ and Θ as determinants of
optimal investment directly (negatively related in the case of µ) rather than only through
the cross partial derivative,

. The effect of a change in dividend taxation on share

issuance and investment, however, is consistent with BDK. For the financially
constrained firm, an increase in dividend taxation increases the right hand side of (5.2.6')
and thus decreases

and

, just as for dividend-paying firms.

The major shortcoming of this model is that, while it does provide an explanation
for the simultaneous issuance of new shares and payment of dividends, and also predicts
a negative effect of dividend tax changes on investment, it does not offer clear
predictions as to the optimal dividend response to changes in the tax parameters. Share
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issuance is optimized to obtain the monitoring benefits and varies with the tax
parameters, but dividends are still effectively determined as a residual.
Endogenous Discounting: A New Look at the Old View
The old (or traditional) view, on the other hand, assumes that shareholders derive
benefits from the payment of dividends based on signaling or the restriction of
managerial discretion over surplus cash (Poterba and Summers 1985), and thus the firm
optimizes dividends rather than share issuance. These benefits are assumed to manifest
as an effect of dividend payout ratios (dividends over corporate net income) on the
shareholders’ required return; that is,
( )
where

,

and

⁄[ ( )(

)]. Incorporating this relationship

between the payout ratio and the discount rate into the optimization problem requires a
modification to the discount factor in equation (5.1.3) and the addition of a constraint
defining the evolution of this discount factor. Specifically, in place of the term

in

equation (5.1.3), we define a new discounting term, Δ, such that
∫
The evolution of

(

)

(

.

)

(5.3.1)

is given by the equation
̇

(
(

)
)

.

(5.3.2)

Adapting the Poterba and Summers model to continuous time and my notation,
and adding the state equation (5.3.2), the firm’s problem is restated as
[

∫
subject to
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]

(5.3.3)

( )(

)
̇
(

̇

(

)
)

̅
Following Obstfeld (1990), the present value Hamiltonian for the problem is
[
̃[ ( )(

]
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̃(
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]
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)

)

(

)

)

̃[

̅ ]

(5.3.4)

where ̃ is the co-state variable for the new state variable, Δt, , and the other multipliers
are the present value analogs of the current value multipliers from equation (5.1.6). Firstorder conditions are
̃

) (

(

̃

)(

̃

) (

(

)

̃

̃

̃
̃

̃

)

̃[

̃

[

(

)

]

̃̇

]

̃̇

Note that the multipliers in this case are the present value analogs to those of the currentvalue Hamiltonian solution of the new view model above. In particular,
̃
̃̇
̇

̇
̇
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(
(

)
)

̃
̃̇
̇
̃

(

̇
̇

, ̃

)

(

, and ̃

)

.

Using this correspondence between the present- and current-value multipliers, we
can substitute the current-value form for all of the multipliers and eliminate the
discounting terms. Rearranging, we have the following restated conditions in the same
current-value terms as in the new view case:
) (

(

)(

(5.3.5)

)

(5.3.6)
(5.3.7)
) (

(

[

)

(

)
(
(

)
)

(

]

(

)
)

̇

(5.3.8)

̇

(5.3.9)

Some immediate similarities and differences between this old view result and the
new view result can be seen. First, combining (5.3.6) and (5.3.7), we have
as before. However, from (5.3.5) and (5.3.6),
to simply

(

in the new view case. Since

) (

)(

, just
, as opposed

)

by assumption, the equilibrium

marginal q derived under the old view is strictly greater than under the new view.
Assuming first an inside solution with positive dividends and the share repurchase
constraint non-binding, then μ = γ = 0 and q = 1. In this case, the necessary conditions
(5.3.5) thru (5.3.7) can be reduced to
(

) (

)

(
44

)(

),

(5.3.10)

which we will use again below to simplify (3.7). First, though, by rearranging equation
(5.3.10), we have
(

(

)

) ( )(

).

(5.3.11)

The left hand side of (5.3.11) is, in current value Hamiltonian terms,

or

the marginal benefit of an increase in the payout ratio. For optimality, this must equal the
marginal cost in additional shareholder taxes of such an increase, given by the right hand
side.6 This expression, however, includes the unobservable shadow value, λ. We can
eliminate it using equation (5.3.9), the necessary condition with respect to the state
variable Δ. Equation (5.3.9) equates the period t return to the discount rate times the
shadow value of an exogenous reduction in the discount rate minus the period t change in
the shadow value term. Assuming steady state where ̇

and solving for λ, this

shadow value, in equilibrium, is equal to the period t net cash return to shareholders,
discounted in perpetuity at the period t discount rate (gross of capital gains taxes) or
(

)(

(

)

) .

Rearranging slightly so that the left hand side equals
(

, we have

)
(

)

,

the right hand side of which is substituted into equation (5.3.11) to eliminate the co-state
variable. After some algebra, we derive the Euler equation that implicitly determines
optimal dividend policy:

6

This can be seen more clearly by multiplying both sides by dα. A change in the payout ratio from, say, 0.5
to 1.0 would have a tax cost equal to 0.5 times the after corporate tax profit times one minus the tax
discrimination parameter.
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(

)
(

)

(

) ( )(

).

(5.3.12)

The left hand side is the marginal benefit of increasing the payout ratio or, again,
. Note, in particular, that marginal benefits are positive whenever the
firm is repurchasing shares (

), regardless of whether the share repurchase

constraint binds, so such a firm should substitute dividend payments for share
repurchases until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of increasing the payout
ratio – the right hand side, as in (5.3.11). This result differs from the new view
conclusion that, given

, firms should only pay dividends after the share

repurchase constraint binds.
Differentiating the right hand side of (5.3.12) with respect to the tax
discrimination parameter, Θ, we find that a rise in Θ (corresponding to a reduction in the
dividend tax penalty resulting from a cut in the dividend tax rate or rise in the capital
gains rate) would, under reasonable conditions, reduce the marginal cost of increasing
dividends.7 The conditions under which these relationships would be expected to hold
are that the firm has positive profits, ( )

, and in the case of

, that the dividend

tax rate is greater than the capital gains tax rate. At the same time, given

, the rise

in Θ also increases the marginal benefit for the dividend-paying firm of an increase in the
payout ratio.8

7

Partial derivatives of the right hand side of (5.3.12) with respect to the tax parameters and the conditional
sign for each are as follows:
( )(
)
if ( )
;
(
8

) ( )

if

( )

, and

.

The partial derivative of the left hand side of (5.3.12) with respect to the tax discrimination parameter is:
(

)

if

.
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Given a rise in Θ, the firm would need to increase the payout ratio to restore the
equality. Similarly, the optimal payout ratio would also be positively related to the
corporate tax rate,

.

Next, using (5.3.6) and rearranging, (5.3.8) can be rewritten as
(

(

)

) (

(

)

)

(

)

̇.

(5.3.13)

Equation (5.3.10) can now be used to simplify (5.3.13), assuming steady state where
̇

, to give us the old view analog to equation (5.1.11), or
(
[(

)(

)
(

)

)](

.

)

(5.3.14)

The equilibrium marginal cost of capital for the dividend-paying firm under the
old view is thus an increasing function of each of the three tax rate parameters, including
the dividend tax rate. This is in contrast to the new view, where the dividend tax rate does
not enter into the cost of capital.
For the financially-constrained firm, which pays no dividend (μ > 0, α = 0) and
repurchases no shares (thus γ = 0), marginal q is again equal to one and, because α = 0,
(5.3.14) becomes
( )
(

)(

.

)

(5.3.15)

This expression, on the surface, appears to be the same as the cost of capital under the
new view, and appears to be a lower cost of capital than that given by (5.3.14) for the
dividend-paying firm whenever

. Recall, however, that the shareholders’

required return is endogenously determined; it is assumed to be a negative function of the
payout ratio, which in this case is zero. We can see, however, that while the cost of
capital is positively related to corporate income and capital gains taxes (and thus optimal
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investment would be negatively related), changes in dividend taxes would not affect
optimal investment for the financially-constrained firm.
However, because of the endogeneity of the discount rate, (5.3.15) does not
suggest that the optimal dividend policy of non-dividend-paying firms generally would
be unaffected by a change in dividend taxation, as suggested by the new view. From
(5.3.12), as noted above, a reduction in the dividend tax rate (an increase in Θ) would
reduce the marginal tax cost of increasing the dividend payout, potentially enabling the
firm to reduce its cost of equity, ρ, by initiating a dividend. If the firm has not exhausted
all profitable investment opportunities at the cost of capital given by (5.3.15), then a
reduction in the dividend tax penalty would not induce the firm to initiate a dividend, but
if the firm is repurchasing shares or even just accumulating surplus cash, then it may
induce an initiation.
Equation (5.3.14) can also be used to evaluate the effects of an exogenous
increase in attractive investment opportunities or an exogenous change in time
preferences of investors (independently of α, perhaps due to a change in real interest
rates). In the former circumstance, the firm faces increased investment opportunities for
which

exceeds the cost of capital, the right hand side of (5.3.14). The firm would

clearly want to increase investment, but the optimal payout ratio being determined by
equation (5.3.12), optimal dividends would be unchanged. The firm would thus reduce
share repurchases (or draw down surplus cash) to fund the increased investment before it
would cut dividends.
An exogenous change in investors’ time preference is more complicated as ρ(α)
appears in the Euler conditions both for optimal investment, equation (5.3.14), and for
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optimal dividends, equation (5.3.12). Higher ρ(α) for all α would directly increase the
cost of capital, reducing optimal investment as some projects no longer return the
(increased) cost of capital. In equation (5.3.12), meanwhile, higher ρ(α) for all α would
reduce the value on the left hand side, the marginal benefit of a dividend increase. A
reduction in dividends in favor of share repurchases would increase the value on the left
hand side to restore the equality.
Summary
The Euler equations for optimal investment derived from the three models,
equating the marginal profit from the last dollar of equilibrium investment to the cost of
capital, are summarized in Table 1 below. The equilibrium value of q, the increase in
firm value from the equilibrium marginal dollar of investment, is also provided.
Table 1. Optimal Investment, Cost of Capital, and q.
Model

Cost of Capital

New View

Monitoring
Benefits

(

)(

)

(

)(

)

(

Old View
[(

)(

Eq. #

)

)
(

Equilibrium q

(5.1.11)

if D>0
if D=0

(5.2.8)

if D>0
if D=0

(5.3.14)
)](

)

For the new view model, surplus cash flow after the optimal level of investment, I*,
defined by equation (5.1.11) has been funded would first be used to fund share
repurchases and then, once further repurchases are not possible, to pay dividends. For the
monitoring benefits and old view models, optimality requires satisfaction of an additional
condition in each, implicitly defining optimal new share issuance, V*, in the former and
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optimal dividends, D*, in the latter. In each case, the remaining variable (D and V,
respectively) is determined as a residual. These conditions are a repeated here for
convenience:
Monitoring
benefits V*:
Old view D*:

(
(

)
)

(

)

.

(

) ( )(

(5.2.6')
).

(5.3.12)

Predictions derived from these optimality conditions with regard to the responses
of investment, dividends, and in the case of the monitoring benefits model, share issuance
to changes in tax and other parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Predictions.
Predicted responses to exogenous changes in tax parameters, time preferences or
investment opportunities, ceteris paribus.
Parameter
Choice
τd
τg
τc
ρ2
πk2
Model
Regime1
Var
Unconstrained
I
0
–
–
–
+
New View
D
0
0/+3
0/+3
0/+3
–
Constrained
I
0
–
–
–
+
D
0
0/+3
0/+3
0/+3
0
I
–
+/–
–
–
+
Monitoring Unconstrained
V
–
+
–
0
0
Benefits
D
+/–
+
+/–
+
–
Constrained
I
–
+/–
–
–
+
V
–
+
–
0
0
D
+/0
+/0
+/0
+/0
0
Unconstrained
I
–
–
–
–
+
Old View
D
–
+
+
–
0/–4
Constrained
I
0
–
–
–
+
D
0
+/0
+/0
0
0
1. A constrained firm is one for which the budget constraint binds with Dt = 0 and Vnt ≥ 0.
2. The final two columns represent, respectively, responses to exogenous changes in shareholder
required returns and available investment opportunities; that is, higher or lower ρ for all levels of
α and πk for all levels of K.
3. Dividend increase only after the share repurchase constraint binds.
4. Dividend reduction only after share repurchases reduced to zero.
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CHAPTER VI
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

The empirical literature on dividend payout behavior of firms extends back at
least to Lintner (1956), who hypothesized a dynamic adjustment process whereby firms
change dividend payouts to bring them closer over time to some “optimum” payout,
determined by net profits and a target payout ratio. The first to estimate the effects of
changes in dividend taxation was Feldstein (1970, 1972), who introduced a tax
discrimination parameter (along with other modifications) to Lintner’s optimum dividend
equation. Feldstein estimated the effect on dividend payouts from the British repeal in
1958 of a differential tax on distributed profits. Prior to 1958, British corporations had
been taxed on distributed profits at up to eleven times the rate on retained profits, with
the objective of discouraging dividends and encouraging investment (Rubner 1964).
Feldstein’s analysis was criticized by King (1971, 1972), but both authors concluded that
dividend payouts do respond to changes in dividend taxation, differing only as to the size
of the effect.
More recent literature has looked at changes in dividend taxation in the United
States, Australia, Finland, and other countries, investigating effects on dividend payouts,
stock repurchases, stock prices, corporate investment, and capital structure decisions of
firms. This chapter reviews the most relevant of this empirical literature, particularly
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research investigating the effects of the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA”).
JGTRRA and Payout Policies
JGTRRA reduced the tax rate on qualified dividends to a maximum of 15 percent
(from ordinary income rates), simultaneously reducing the maximum rate on long-term
capital gains from 20 percent to 15 percent, thus sharply reducing the tax discrimination
in U.S. personal income taxation against dividend income. Enacted May 28, 2003 and
retroactive to January 1, 2003, JGTRRA provided the first reduction in the maximum tax
rate on dividend income relative to capital gains tax rates since 1986 and thus offered a
unique opportunity to study the effects of dividend tax changes on the payout behavior of
firms. Several authors have written on the topic over the nine years since passage.
Chetty and Saez (2004, 2005) study the effects of JGTRRA on dividend policy on
the extensive and intensive margins; that is dividend initiations or terminations, and
increases or decreases where dividends were positive both before and after the change.
The data cover up to six thousand U.S. firms (varying by year and excluding financial
and utility stocks) with shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets over
the period 1980 thru the first or second quarter of 2004 (the later paper including the
addition quarter) on a quarterly basis. They also used annual data on insider and taxable
institutional ownership to test for agency model incentive or monitoring effects on the
response to the tax cut.
Chetty and Saez (2004) model regular dividend payment amounts (in real $) in
OLS regressions on treatment dummies (pre- and post-reform quarters), a time trend, and
lags (8) of dividend amounts, with or without financial and industry code controls.
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Coefficients on the treatment dummies (for the quarter of announcement and the first
quarter after passage of JGTRRA, 2003-Q1 and Q3, respectively) were positive, but they
were not statistically significant and dropped considerably with the removal of the five
largest firms as of 2004 from the sample. Results were better for pooled probit models of
dividend payment (the dependent variable equals one for periods where the firm pays a
dividend and zero otherwise), with significant positive coefficients for both 2003-Q1 and
2003-Q3, and a larger effect after passage than after announcement of JGTRRA. Probit
models of initiations, dividend increases (>20%), and special dividends also produced
significant positive estimates, except that for increases and special dividends, the effect
only appears after passage of JGTRRA (2003-Q3).
Other issues raised by Chetty and Saez (2004) include possible attrition or
survival bias, and spurious treatment effects. Possible biases arise from firms dropping
out of the sample due to reasons that are correlated with dividend payments, such as
bankruptcy or merger, or the likelihood that firms remaining in the sample longer may be
systematically more likely to pay or increase dividends in the later, post-reform periods.
To address the possibility of spurious treatment or placebo effects, they ran models
framed around different hypothetical treatment periods and found no effect except around
the actual treatment periods; that is, after announcement and passage of JGTRRA.
Chetty and Saez (2005) focused next on the effects of ownership on the response
to the tax cut. Using a simple difference-in-difference analysis, they find that nontaxable institutional ownership9 (the case for firms in the control group) is associated

9

The largest institutional owner of firm shares in the quarter is one classified by the authors as
“nonaffected” by the tax change. The authors got similar results with alternative definitions of the control
group.
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with no response to the tax cut in terms of dividend initiation rates, while the “treated”
group showed a substantial positive response. However, as the authors note, the
possibility of some other cause for the observed increase in initiation rates (e.g. U.S.
corporate financial scandals around the same period) cannot be ruled out. Finally, the
authors also observed that the frequency of dividend initiations also appears to increase
the most in the post-reform period for firms with higher taxable institutional ownership.
Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford (2004, 2007) also analyze dividend declarations
in the quarters surrounding passage of JGTRRA for evidence of increases in dividend
payments attributable to the act. Their identification strategy is to test whether the effect
appears to be increasing in ownership by taxable individual shareholders, the only
shareholders affected by the tax cut. They also hypothesized that, to the extent regular
dividend payments are motivated by signaling benefits, tax-motivated changes in
dividend policy could distort the intended signal and that this may lead to firms paying
special dividends rather than increasing regular dividends in response to JGTRRA. In
addition, firms may substitute special dividends for share repurchases as the latter lost its
substantial tax advantage.
The dependent variable in the earlier paper’s regular dividend payment models is
the change in dividends declared per share from the pre-enactment period to the postenactment period. Models are OLS with a lag of the dependent variable, lagged change
in earnings per share, the dividend yield prior to enactment, and ownership variables as
regressors. The sample is 1,463 U.S. public firms that paid regular dividends in the six
months before or after passage. Similar regressions were run on 82 special dividend
payers over the four quarters surrounding enactment, except with additional financial
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controls (free cash flow per share and the market-to-book value ratio) and a dummy
variable for post-enactment quarters, and without a lag of the dependent variable. They
found evidence that both regular and special dividends increased post-enactment, but no
significant results on the effects of greater individual ownership.
In the 2007 paper, Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford extend the period covered to
eight quarters before and after enactment, but focus on the payout mix rather than
amounts; that is, dividends divided by the sum of dividends and share repurchases. This
later paper finds that firms did substitute dividends for repurchases and that substitution
was increasing in ownership by individual investors, as expected.
A 2011 paper by these authors again investigates the payout mix question, but
now also controlling for the degree of three types of taxable ownership (Blouin, Raedy,
and Shackleford 2011). The authors hypothesize that both taxable investors and firms
might be expected to respond to JGTRRA, with the former increasing their holdings of
higher dividend-paying stocks and the latter increasing dividend payouts relative to share
repurchases. Investor and firm responses are simultaneously determined in a system of
equations –one each for the percentage of firm shares held by insiders, by non-insider
individual investors, and by mutual funds as well as one where the dependent variable is
the dividend share of total payouts. The results for the dividend share equation are
consistent with what Chetty and Saez (2005) observed with regard to dividend initiations;
that is, the dividend share of total payouts increased after JGTRRA in accordance with
ownership of firm shares by individuals (insiders and non-insiders) and mutual funds.
Thus the greater is the firm’s ownership by insiders, non-insider individual investors, or
mutual funds, the greater is the increase in the dividend share of payouts post-JGTRRA.
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Other studies of the effects of JGTRRA on dividend policies of firms include two
that use logistic regressions to investigate firm characteristics that might be associated
with a larger payout post-JGTRRA (Howton and Howton 2006) or whether changes in
the dividend tax penalty lead firms to substitute dividends for share repurchases (Moser
2007). No published studies can be found more recent than the 2004 Chetty and Saez,
and Blouin, Ready, and Shackelford papers discussed above that have modeled the
response to JGTRRA in terms of amounts of dividends paid or payout ratios rather than
as binary decisions to pay, increase, or decrease dividends. Possible improvements on
this literature include extending the time period of the data post-enactment; including
additional control variables suggested by neoclassical or other theory; using annual rather
than quarterly data to allow for inclusion of financial variables only reported in firms’
annual financial statements (e.g. capital expenditures); and applying appropriate
econometric methods for addressing potential survivorship (or attrition) bias and other
issues to be discussed in the next chapter.
Other Payout Policy Studies
In addition to studies of the JGTRRA dividend tax cut, others have looked at the
determinants of dividend policy on either a single- or multi-nation basis. Pattenden and
Twite (2008) present a single country study of the dividend policy effects of tax changes
around the introduction of a full imputation system of dividend taxation in Australia in
1987. This study uses firm level data covering the period 1982-1997 in pooled
regressions of gross and regular dividends (log of the payout ratio), as well as a logit
regression of dividend initiations, controlling for firm financial characteristics, industry,
and GDP growth. Their results show a significant positive increase in all payout
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measures and in initiations in the post-reform period. Another single-country study is
that of Kari, Karikallio, and Pirttilä (2008), who look at the Finnish dividend tax increase
of 2005 and find a decline in dividend payments among closely held corporations, but no
effect on investment.
Recent multi-nation dividend policy studies include Denis and Osobov (2008),
who study payout policies in six of the G8 nations over the period 1989-2002, and Eije
and Megginson (2008), who look at dividends and repurchases over the period 19912005 in the15 nations that were European Union members prior to May 2004. The
former uses logit regressions (separately by country and year) with the dependent
variable equal to one if a dividend is paid in the period and using controls for firm size,
market-to-book ratio, percent change in assets, and profitability. The primary variable of
interest was the ratio of accumulated retained earnings to total equity, which they used as
a proxy for the maturity of the company. The authors found that firms with
proportionally greater retained equity balances were significantly more likely to pay
dividends. However, they estimate the regressions separately for each year, as several
country cross-sections, rather than as a panel and do not consider changes in tax policy.
Eije and Megginson use random effects logit regressions to estimate propensity to
pay a dividend or, alternately, to repurchase shares. Controls are similar to those of
Denis and Osobov, plus measures for balance sheet leverage, volatility of earnings, firm
age, and several dummy variables, including one for having a common law-based legal
system. Their estimated coefficient on the retained-to-total equity variable was
statistically insignificant for both dividends and repurchases, contradicting the findings of
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Denis and Osobov. Age of firm, however, showed a positive effect on dividends, but not
on repurchases.
Similar panel regressions for the real amount of dividend payments or repurchases
(in log form) found results similar to the logit regressions. The retained-to-total equity
variable was statistically insignificant for both dividends and repurchases, while age was
positive for both. However, like Denis and Osobov, this study also neglected to control
for changes in tax policies. Nevertheless, these studies highlight a number of potential
control variables.
Cost of Capital and Tax Capitalization
Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li (2007) point out that, holding earnings expectations
constant, changes in the implied or ex-ante cost of equity capital “perfectly map” onto
changes in stock prices; that is, they are “equivalent methods of detecting a possible tax
effect.” Thus a decrease in the ex-ante cost of equity capital attributable to a dividend tax
cut would be equivalent to (at least partial) capitalization of the tax savings into the stock
price, as predicted by the new view. Full capitalization of a dividend tax cut would
require that the stock price rise, reducing the implied pre-tax cost of equity capital, such
that the implied after-tax cost is the same after as before the tax change, all else held
constant.
Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li (2007) as well as Guenther, Jung, and Williams (2005)
offer two recent studies that estimate the effects of the JGTRRA on the cost of equity
capital, finding that firms realized a cost of capital reduction from the tax rate reduction,
ceteris paribus. Guenther, Jung, and Williams estimate ex-ante, risk-based cost of equity
capital as the average of three estimation methods from the accounting and finance
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literature. The basic idea of each is based on the dividend discount model of stock
valuation; that is, to estimate the discount rate that equates the present value of the
expected stream of future pre-tax cash returns to the current stock price, deducting the
risk free rate of interest. Inputs to the cost of capital calculations are forward dividend,
earnings, and long-term earnings growth estimates from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). The risk-free rate is the ten-year Treasury Constant Maturity
Rate. The authors then regress the change in ex-ante cost of capital from NovemberDecember 2002 to June-July 2003 on leverage and market value measures; the estimated
market “beta” on the stock; industry dummy variables; and indicators for post-enactment
new equity issues (under the hypothesis that firms planning new equity offerings should
realize a greater cost of capital benefit from the tax cut) and for payment of a dividend in
2002. Regression results indicate i) a significant reduction in cost of capital for all firms;
ii) no significant difference in the effect on dividend-paying and non-paying firms; iii) a
significantly larger effect (greater reduction) for firms planning new equity issues; and iv)
a still larger effect for firms planning new equity issues that were also dividend payers in
2002. In regressions of only dividend paying firms, they also found that firms
distributing a larger portion of their earnings (as either dividends or repurchases) realized
a larger reduction in their cost of equity capital after the tax cut.
Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li use similar methods to estimate the cost of equity capital
over 12 calendar quarters ending December 2001 to September 2004. The treatment
variable in the regressions is an indicator for periods ending after May 2003, when the
JGTRRA was passed. Controls include measures of institutional ownership, the growth
rate and dispersion of analyst estimates of forward earnings, industry average cost of
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capital, three risk measures from the finance literature, and firm financial and valuation
characteristics. This study’s estimate of the average treatment effect is about a 1
percentage point decrease in cost of capital, similar to that of Guenther, Jung, and
Williams, and is significant at the one percent level. The estimated effect is decreasing in
institutional ownership, consistent with the authors’ presumption that the tax change
would not generally affect institutional investors. Unlike Guenther, Jung, and Williams
and contrary to the authors’ expectations, however, this study finds a larger decrease in
cost of equity capital for non-dividend paying firms.10
However, the ex-ante cost of equity capital is measured as a negative partial
function of the stock price, and stock prices may rise or fall in the short run for many
reasons, or for no obvious reason. Given the vagaries of the stock market, one cannot
rule out the possibility that the rise in stock prices and corresponding declines in the exante cost of equity after enactment of JGTRRA are due to unobserved factors.
Possibilities include geo-political and macroeconomic developments that affect investor
expectations (or risk tolerance), but are not reflected in analysts’ earnings forecasts or
other control variables in the models.
Rather than measuring the ex-ante cost of equity capital, Auerbach and Hassett
(2007) attempt to measure the effect of JGTRRA on firms’ valuations, testing how
market value gains (specifically, abnormal returns) differ by firm characteristics,
including dividend payment status and yield before passage, and propensity to issue new
shares or repurchase shares after passage. Abnormal returns are estimated over 5-day
event windows around eight “key event dates” in the process toward passage of

10

Auerbach and Hassett (2007) anticipate this result for non-dividend paying firms.
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JGTRRA, from December 2002 through May 2003, using regression equations based on
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
The authors find that abnormal returns in response to key events that increased the
likelihood of a dividend tax cut were positively related to dividend yields prior to the first
news of a possible dividend tax cut. This finding would be consistent, without
qualification, with the old view of dividend taxation and would be consistent with the
new view only if the tax cut is viewed as being temporary. Similarly, they expect a
positive response to these key events for “immature” or non-dividend-paying firms if the
dividend tax cut is perceived as being permanent on the grounds that forward-looking
investors would place a higher value on expected future dividends, even if there are none
now, if they will be taxed at a lower rate. Furthermore, they suggest that non-dividendpayers that are expected to issue new shares in the future to raise capital should show a
larger positive response, consistent with what Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li found, but didn’t
expect, with regard to the ex-ante cost of capital. Auerbach and Hassett reason that
future share issues dilute the claims of current shareholders on future dividends, thus
expected share issues would reduce the current value of the firm. However, a tax cut that
increases the after-tax value of future dividends will also increase the price at which new
shares can be sold, reducing the amount of expected dilution and further increasing the
current equity value.
Investment
There has been little empirical research into the effects of JGTRRA on firm
investment, in particular, even though encouraging business investment was the primary
justification for its dividend and capital gains tax cuts. Desai and Goolsbee (2004)
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conduct one such study, using a neoclassical framework to investigate whether firms
responded as proponents of the old view and JGTRRA predicted, and whether what some
argued was a non-response was actually due to an “investment overhang” from the late
1990s investment boom. In other words, did this overhang reduce investment in the
recovery years after the boom ended and mask a real response to the tax cuts, or was
there no real response at all, as the new view predicts?
Desai and Goolsbee conclude that the data appears more consistent with the new
view prediction, that there was no impact on investment from the dividend tax cut. They
also find no effect from earlier, smaller changes in depreciation allowances, including
partial expensing provisions that took effect in 2002. However, the firm-level data they
use cover only through 2003, so given the likely dynamic nature of firm investment
decisions (as suggested by the overhang question), this study may have been hasty in its
conclusions.
Financial Structure
Recent empirical literature on financial structure effects of tax changes is also
limited and, to my knowledge, no firm-level study has looked at the effects of JGTRRA
in this regard. A pre-JGTRRA study into these effects is that of Gordon and Lee (2001),
who use SOI corporate tax return data in a model that incorporates firm and shareholder
level taxes, and non-tax factors likely to influence debt policies of firms. Data are
aggregated in the SOI files for confidentiality reasons, but key data are reported by asset
size interval categories, allowing the authors to calculate marginal corporate tax rates by
firm size category and estimate tax effects on the use of debt finance as a function of firm
size. The dependent variable in Gordon and Lee’s model is the debt-to-assets ratio of
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firms (as an average for each size class) and the tax variable of interest is the marginal
corporate tax rate calculated for each size class less the marginal tax rate applicable to
interest income for the average investor in debt (including non-taxable investors).
However, only in one specification does the tax variable account for dividend and capital
gains taxes, and they are combined with corporate taxes and interest income taxes into
one variable. Results suggest a significant positive relationship between corporate tax
rates and debt levels in general, but the contribution of personal taxes to this effect is not
clear.
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CHAPTER VII
DATA, EMPIRICAL METHODS, AND HYPOTHESES

The empirical analysis utilizes a panel of U.S. firms over a sixteen year period,
1994-2009, on a fiscal year basis. The objective of the analysis is to test predictions from
theory about the effects on dividend policy and investment from changes in dividend
taxation. Before proceeding, however, there are several econometric issues that
complicate the analysis. This chapter describes the firm sample and data to be used, and
the issues that affect the choice of econometric methods, and then outlines the chosen
methods.
U.S. Firm Sample and Data

Selection of Sample Time Period and Firms
Considerations in sample selection included having a sample that is representative
of firms in all major industry sectors (with exceptions as described below) and of all
sizes, and having reliable and consistently reported financial data spanning several
periods before and after passage of JGTRRA. Previous empirical literature using U.S.
firm-level data addresses a variety of related topics, as discussed in Chapter VI, including
dividend policy, cost of capital, investment, and financial structure. Firm samples,
periods covered, and data frequency varied considerably in these studies.
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Studies of stock price and cost of equity capital effects tend to use higher
frequency data – e.g. quarterly financial statement data or daily stock market data. Of the
payout policy studies reviewed in Chapter VI that investigate effects of JGTRRA, Chetty
and Saez (2004, 2005), and Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford (2004, 2007) use quarterly
firm financial data, but doing so precluded the inclusion of any measure of firm
investment since most firms report capital expenditures only on an annual basis. Annual
data were used by Howton and Howton (2006), and Moser (2007), and are also used here
to allow inclusion of capital expenditures in the analysis.
The period covered, again, is firm fiscal years 1994 through 2009, several years
longer than other studies of the effects of JGTRRA. The beginning period, consisting of
firm fiscal years ending between June 1994 and May 1995, is the earliest full period
during which the personal income tax increases passed in 1993 were in effect.11 The
periods covered include two relevant tax changes, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA97), which cut the top capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent, and
JGTRRA in 2003. It also includes two extended periods of economic expansion and two
recessions.
As for the selection of firms to include in the analysis, the literature varies here as
well, from only S&P 500 firms as of January 2003 to all U.S. public companies covered
by I/B/E/S or other data sources. The S&P 500, of course, is only representative of
established, large capitalization firms and selection into the S&P 500 is likely correlated
with firms’ propensities to pay and increase dividends. The universe of public companies

11

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was proposed in February 1993 and passed Congress in
June. Though it did not change capital gains tax rates or the treatment of dividends, it did raise the top
marginal tax rate on ordinary income, and thus dividends, from 31 percent to 39.6 percent, substantially
increasing the tax advantage of capital gains.
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in the U.S., meanwhile, is unnecessarily broad, and introduces issues of data availability
and reliability.
The S&P 1500, on the other hand, includes a broad range of firm sizes while also
accounting for more than 90 percent of the market capitalization of U.S. publicly-traded
firms. The index is designed to represent and replicate the performance of the universe of
tradable U.S. stocks, with industry sector representation mirroring the broader market.
The sample used herein is drawn from this index – more specifically, the components of
the S&P 1500 as of December 31, 2002, immediately prior to the proposal of the
JGTRRA tax cuts.
Depending on the research objective and the types of data used, it is common in
firm-level studies to exclude certain industry sectors. Utility companies are sometimes
excluded because they may be subject to regulation that can impact financial and
investment decisions (Chetty and Saez 2004, 2005). More often, financial firms such as
banks, securities brokers, and insurance carriers are excluded (Chetty and Saez 2004,
2005; Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford 2007; Moser 2007). Such firms are also regulated,
especially with regard to capital requirements and capital structures, but because of the
nature of their businesses, their financial statements are in many important respects not
comparable to non-financial firms.
Financial firms, those with GICS sector code 40 or 2-digit NAICS code 52, are
excluded here. In addition, real estate investment trusts (REITs), generally falling under
4-digit NAICS code 5311, are also excluded. REITs are investment companies that are
taxed only at the personal level, as pass-through entities, provided at least 90 percent of
their earnings are distributed to shareholders. In total, 219 firms were dropped for these
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reasons. One additional stock in the index was a “tracking stock”—a special class of
stock designed to track the performance of a specific subsidiary or division within a
larger company, and was also dropped. Another was dropped because of inconsistencies
in the data from year-to-year and with SEC reports, leaving 1,279 firms. The distribution
of firms by 2-digits NAICS code is provided in Table 3.12
Table 3. Sample Firms by NAICS Sector Code.
Code
11
21
22
23
31-33
42
44-45
48-49
51
52
53
54
55
56
61
62
71
72
81
92
99

Description
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Transportation and Warehousing
Information
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Management of Companies and Enterprises
Administrative and Support and Waste Management
and Remediation Services
Educational Services
Health Care and Social Assistance
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
Accommodation and Food Services
Other Services (except Public Administration)
Public Administration
Unclassified
Total Firms

# Firms
4
56
82
18
626
50
95
43
116
6
5
57
0
33
8
26
6
37
5
0
6
1,279

Lastly, for firms in existence prior to fiscal 1994, 1993 data was collected as well
in order to allow for lags of certain financial variables. For firms entering after 1994, the

12

Remaining firms in the finance and insurance classification have been identified and confirmed to be
non-financial firms, in most cases firms offering transaction or information processing services to financial
firms.
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data includes the year the firm became publicly traded and generally one prior year, if
available, again to allow for lags. The average firm appears in the dataset for about 14.5
years, not including 1993 data.

Firm-Level Data
Firm-level data for the U.S. panel are from the Compustat North America
database and are derived from public filings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).13 The data are annual and include financial measures from firms’
published financial statements as well as variables identifying each firm’s industry, fiscal
year end, and other firm-specific information. A small amount of data missing from the
Compustat database was filled in from firms’ SEC filings. Key financial variables
included are listed, with their Compustat variable name, in Table 4. “Type” indicates
whether the variable is a balance sheet (bs), income statement (is), or statement of cash
flows (cf) item. In regressions, balance sheet variables associated with any period, t, are
beginning balances; that is, measured as of the prior year end. Flow variables, from the
income and cash flow statements, are for the given period, t. In addition to these
financial measures, the percent ownership of the firms’ shares by institutional investors is
included where available.14

13

Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing this dissertation. This service and the
data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property and trade secrets of WRDS and/or its thirdparty suppliers.
14
This variable, from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database (accessed through Wharton
Research Data Services), is available for about 81 percent of firm-year observations.

68

Table 4. Firm-Level Financial Data.
Label
che
at
dlc
dltt
ceq
dp
ni
ebitda
dvc
capx

Description
Cash and Equivalents
Total Assets
Debt in Current Liabilities
Total Long-term Debt
Common Equity – Total
Depreciation
Net Income
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation,
and Amortization
Dividends on Common Stock
Capital Expenditures

Type
bs
bs
bs
bs
bs
is
is
is
is
cf

Other Data
Additional variables used in the analysis include four forward-looking aggregate
economic measures as proxies for the attractiveness of business investment. While new
view theory suggests dividends, as residual payments, depend directly on the level of
capital expenditures, the old view and some agency theories suggest that capital
expenditures and dividends are simultaneously determined. Thus capital expenditures
would be endogenous if included as an explanatory variable for dividends. The four
aggregate economic variables are thus candidates for instruments for the possibly
endogenous firm investment. These variables are the University of Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index; the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 50-state leading index; and
the capacity utilization rate reported by the Federal Reserve Board. Interest rates enter
into the cost of capital directly, affecting the value of the firm and its investment
decisions, so nominal and real interest rate measures are also included. Summary
statistics for these data as well as the firm-level variables are provided in Appendix A.
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Some Empirical Issues
The firm-level nature of the data gives rise to a few issues that should be
addressed, including issues of attrition or survivorship, firms changing fiscal year-ends,
potential influential observations problems, and an excess zeroes problem.

Attrition/Survivorship
The firm sample, again, is comprised of non-financial firms in the S&P 1500
index as of December 31, 2002, just prior to proposal of the JGTRRA dividend tax cut.
The number of years firms appear in the sample, however, varies as many firms did not
exist or, at least, were not publicly traded until sometime after 1994. Similarly, some
firms drop out of the sample after December 2002 due to mergers, buyouts, or
bankruptcies. If firms entering the sample after 1994 or exiting before their 2009 fiscal
year are systematically different from firms that are included for the full period, then this
could bias the empirical results. For example, firms entering may be younger and in need
of external funding for investment, and thus unlikely to pay a dividend. Firms exiting, on
the other hand, might be in financial distress in their final periods in the sample.
Of the 1279 firms, 187 went public in an initial public offering (“IPO”) in 1994 or
later, excluding those whose IPO was part of a spin-off from another firm. Spin-offs
account for 77 entries in fiscal 1994 or later. An additional 63 held an IPO and 9 were
spin-offs in 1993. Four firms entered in 1994 or later as a result of mergers of already
public firms or emergence from bankruptcy reorganization, or began trading publicly on
the so-called OTC Bulletin Board (a.k.a. the “pink sheets”) prior to a public offering of
stock and listing on an exchange. An entry flag dummy variable is set equal to one for
these 340 firms in the year of the IPO, spin-off, or other entry.
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Firms exiting prior to their 2009 fiscal year total 327 and these are similarly
flagged with an exit dummy variable equal to one in the last observation period if before
fiscal 2009. 27 of these firms exited prior to reporting any fiscal year results for fiscal
2003 and for another 37, fiscal 2003 was the last reported period; these firms are
excluded from the regressions. The most common reason, by far, for firms to exit is
because of being acquired or merged into another firm. As firms may be targets for
acquisition or merger for a variety of reasons and at any stage of firm development, there
is no obvious reason to presume that they are systematically better capitalized or more in
need of capital, or more or less likely to pay or increase dividends. Table 5 shows the
numbers of firm exits by reason, as coded in Compustat, and by fiscal year.
Table 5. Firm Exits by Last Reported Fiscal Year and Reason for Exit.

Reason
pre-2004
Acquisition/Merger
54
Bankruptcy
2
Liquidation
3
Leveraged Buyout
2
Now Private
2
Other
1
Total
64

2004
48
2

Fiscal Year
2005 2006
52
70
2
1
1
1

1
1
52

1
56

3
75

2007
35
5

2
3
45

2008
22
7
2
1
3
35

Total
281
17
9
3
6
11
327

Another perspective on firm exits considers the potential for bias based on
surviving firms being systematically different than those dropping out – in this context,
the concern being whether the remaining firms, by virtue of surviving longer, are more
mature or financially stronger, and thus more likely to pay dividends. However, given
the very small numbers of firms exiting for reasons of bankruptcy or liquidation, there is
again little reason to expect the survivors to be systematically different from exiting
firms. Nevertheless, the exit flag dummy variable enables testing for attrition or
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survivorship bias. In addition, while firm age is not necessarily a good measure of firm
maturity (and no consistent measure of firm age is available, anyway), the passage of
time might be correlated with firms reaching the mature stage where cash flows exceed
investment funding needs, leaving funds for distribution to shareholders. To account for
this aging or maturing of firms, a time index can be included in regressions in levels.

Fiscal Year-end Changers
Though relatively rare, on average about 1 percent of firms covered by Compustat
change their fiscal year-end in any given year (Porter et al. 2000; Kamp 2002), often
reporting a stub period of less than 12 months or leaving a gap in reporting, and generally
making periods before and after the change difficult or impossible to compare. Of the
1,279 firms in the dataset, 100 firms changed fiscal year-end between 1994 and 2009,
leaving a gap or a stub period. As a result, these firms cannot be included in regressions
or other analyses of annual data, at least over the periods affected, because missing
months or stub periods make the data not comparable across time. Similar to the attrition
problem, this raises the issue of potential bias if, for example, fiscal year-end changes are
related to financial distress or other characteristics that one might expect to be correlated
with dividends or investment.
Porter et al. (2000), in fact, found that among fiscal year-end changers in 1995
that reported transition period earnings, 62 percent reported a net loss for the period,
compared to only 34 percent of the Compustat universe reporting a net loss for the year.
The authors suggest that firms use such transition periods to mask losses by booking
them in periods many investors overlook. Their sample, however, was very small – only
79 fiscal year-end changers, of which only 63 reported transition period results. Du and
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Zhang (2011) delve more deeply into the “missing months” problem and find that firms
tend to report lower income in the transition periods than they report in adjacent quarters,
consistent with the notion of managing earnings. However, they do not find significant
evidence of such earnings management by firms that shift their year-end by whole
quarters – that is, by three, six, or nine months – as is the case with 64 of the 100 yearend changers in the present sample. They also suggest that lower reported earnings in the
transition months are not necessarily indicative of a negative outlook for the firm.
The most common practice in the accounting literature is to simply drop all firms
that changed their fiscal year-end at any time during the period of study and that was the
approach taken by Blouin, Raedy, and Shacklford (2007) as well. The approach taken
here is to drop only those firms that changed their fiscal year-end during the period 20002005 to ensure at least two full-year observations (plus one year for lagged variables)
before passage of JGTRRA and two years after passage. For year-end changes before or
after that window, respectively, only those observations up to or after the year-end
change are dropped. As a result, 704 total firm-year observations are lost, but only 22
firms are dropped outright.

Influential Observations
Chetty and Saez (2004) noted that, in their regressions of amounts of dividends
paid, results are dominated by a small number of very large firms, leading them to model
binary indicators of dividend payments, increases, initiations, etc. instead. Other studies
have used scaled measures of dividends such as dividends per share (Blouin, Raedy, and
Shackleford 2004), the payout ratio (Pattenden and Twite 2008), or the dividend yield
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(Howton and Howton 2006), narrowing the range of values and eliminating the extreme
values of large firm dividends.
To model dividend payments directly without this problem of extreme values,
scaling by some other variable may solve one problem while introducing new ones. The
payout ratio, for example, is simply dividends divided by net income, but this ratio is
likely to be much more volatile than dividends themselves, rising (falling) because of a
fall (rise) in earnings rather than any change in dividend policy. Similarly, dividend
yields are subject to changes in the market value of the firm’s stock. Scaling dividends
and other variables – e.g. earnings or cash – by outstanding shares avoids this problem of
variation independent of dividend policy, but outstanding shares can change dramatically
because of stock splits, requiring additional calculations to adjust for the splits, and are
not consistently reported in the Compustat data in any case. A simpler approach would
be to scale by a suitable financial variable, such as by total assets as in Auerbach and
Hassett (2003), by total revenues as in Bond, Devereux, and Klemm (2007)15, or by total
financial capital (debt plus equity).
Alternatively, one might rescale all financial variables by taking their natural logs,
but doing so for dividends would have the effect of censoring out non-dividend-paying
firms and possibly introducing selection bias. In addition, to the extent any other
financial variables used in the regressions can take on zero or negative values, a log
transformation would result in lost observations for the remaining, dividend-paying firms.

15

Bond, Devereux, and Klemm actually estimate a weighted least squares model, weighting by the square
of sales, but note that the estimates can be interpreted as equivalent to OLS estimates of a scaled model.

74

Excess Zeroes
Another important empirical issue arises because dividend payments are restricted
to be non-negative, so the dependent variable in dividend payment models is censored,
and because for a large portion of observations – about 40 percent of S&P 1500 firms on
average each year – the value is zero. Figure 8 below shows, for the final sample of
December 2002 S&P 1500 non-financial firms, the distribution of dividend payments
over the entire 1994-2009 period, with over 45 percent of observations equal to zero.
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The theoretical models assume non-negativity of dividends for practical reasons
– public firms cannot call upon shareholders to inject funds into the firm through negative
dividends – so for many firms, the non-negativity constraint binds and results in a corner
solution outcome of zero dividends. In such a corner solution model, OLS is a generally
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inconsistent estimator, whether the entire sample is used or only those observations with
non-zero dividends (Wooldridge 2002). Provided that the dependent variable is
continuous, particularly in the vicinity of the limit (in this case zero), and is observed at
the limit, a Tobit model is the appropriate choice for estimating such a corner solution
model.

Dynamic Processes and Other Issues
As previously noted, surveys of dividend policy from Lintner (1956) to Brav et al.
(2008) suggest that, for whatever reason, firm managers place a high priority on
maintaining historical dividend policies. This suggests a dynamic process in the data as
current payouts depend on past payouts, in addition to earnings, investment opportunities,
and other factors. In addition, shocks to firm earnings, investment outlook, or other
factors may persist and affect multiple periods. Finally, because firms are often affected
by common aggregate or industry shocks to investment opportunities that may not be
captured by the explanatory variables, and because firms’ payout policies may be
interdependent as they compete for analyst and investor favor, cross-sectional
dependence is likely as well. The empirical model should ideally account for possible
cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
Regression Model and Methods
The primary equation of interest relates dividend payments to the explanatory
variables, including the likely endogenous level of investment. Specifically, the
hypothesized relationship is given by
(7.3.1)
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(7.3.2)
where

is the dividend payout (scaled by total assets),

represents the vector of

exogenous variables (including financial variables, tax change and other dummy
variables, and the intercept term),

represents endogenous capital expenditures,

represents a vector of instruments, the s and
coefficient, respectively, and

and

are a coefficient vectors and a scalar

are error terms (including firm and year effects).

As a preliminary step, some simple probit models are run, with binary indicators
of dividend payments (“Payer”) as the dependent variable. The probit model in this
context treats the continuous variable dividends as a latent variable, observable only as a
discrete choice – to pay or not to pay – even though dividends are, in fact, observed. It
has been used in the literature in the context of JGTRRA, so is included here in part for
comparison, but also to model dividend initiations. Next, the model is estimated by
ordinary least squares (“OLS”), ignoring the likely endogeneity of CAPEX. To address
the endogeneity issue, instrumental variable probit (“IV Probit”) and two-stage least
squares (“2SLS”) regressions are run, instrumenting for CAPEX with several aggregate
and firm-specific variables described in the next chapter.
Again, the issue of non-negative dividends, resulting in around 45% of firms
paying zero dividends on average each year, is inherent in the decision problem of the
firm and presents a problem for the linear models of dividend payment above. The
corner solution model takes the form
(

)
.
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(7.3.3)
(7.3.4)

This is the standard censored or type I pooled Tobit model, except that in this case,
does not represent a latent variable, but rather one that is observed even at the zero corner
solution.
Finally, the likelihood of serial dependence in the data, survey evidence on
preferences for consistency in dividend policy, and empirical evidence suggesting a
partial adjustment (to earnings) process in dividend payments, all suggest modeling these
dynamic processes directly by including lagged variables in the dividend equation. A
lagged dependent variable (“LDV”) model would be particularly appropriate if firms, in
fact, consciously set dividends in part to be consistent with past dividends and, since we
are estimating a pooled rather than a fixed effects model, does not violate any
methodological assumptions. Thus each of the models described above – probit, IV
probit, OLS, 2SLS, and IV Tobit – are estimated including one lag of the dependent
variable, Payer or Dividend Payment / Assets as appropriate.
Main Hypotheses and Theoretical Predictions
Whether the changes in observed dividend behavior can be attributed to JGTRRA,
or whether firms raised dividends simply out of surplus cash flows and limited
investment opportunities, is the empirical question at hand. Answering it, and
determining whether the results are more supportive of the old or the new view, or some
other view of dividend taxation, requires testing hypotheses based on the predictions of
these models.
The tax changes in TRA97 and JGTRRA, as detailed in Chapter II, included
reductions in capital gains tax rates in both cases and a relatively larger reduction in
dividend taxes in the latter, increasing the tax discrimination parameter, Θ. Predicted
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responses in terms of whether firms pay dividends (Payer), the dividend amount, and
capital expenditures under each of the theoretical models presented in Chapter V are
summarized by Table 6 below.
Table 6. Predicted Dividend and Investment Responses to TRA97 and JGTRRA.

Model
New View
Monitoring Benefits
Old View

JGTRRA
TRA97
JGTRRA
TRA97
JGTRRA
TRA97

Payer (binary)
–
–
+/–
–
+
–

Dependent Variable
Dividends
–
–
+/–
–
+
–

CAPEX
+
+
+
+/–
+
+

Unfortunately, the models are not distinguishable with regard to investment
responses to these tax changes except that, because of its ambiguous predictions, a
negative or zero investment response to TRA97 would be consistent only with the
monitoring benefits model. An increase in investment would be consistent with all three,
though in the case of JGTRRA and the new view, only because of the capital gains tax
cut component. In addition, for constrained firms that neither pay dividends nor
repurchase stock, the dividend response is nil under all three models and both tax changes
because increases in investment would leave the firms still financially constrained and
issuing new shares to fund the increased investment. However, since dividend-paying
firms may find themselves newly financially constrained as a result of increased
investment, termination of dividends after TRA97 would also be consistent with any of
the models. If not terminated, dividends would be expected to decline after TRA97 under
all three models. Where the predictions more clearly differ is in the dividend response to
JGTRRA.
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The new view predicts that dividend-paying firms would reduce dividends after
JGTRRA, ceteris paribus, while those repurchasing stock, but not paying dividends,
would reduce repurchases and leave dividends at zero. Firms not making distributions by
either means would also leave dividends at zero.
The monitoring benefits model produces an ambiguous prediction with regard to
dividends after JGTRRA. Because the dividend tax cut would be expected to increase
both new share issuance and investment through equation (2.6), the dividend response to
that parameter depends on whether the effect on share issuance or investment is larger.
The capital gains tax cut in JGTRRA would affect investment through both the cost of
capital and equation (2.6) with at least partially offsetting effects. Meanwhile, lower
capital gains taxes would tend to reduce share issuance, leaving fewer funds available for
dividend payments. Overall, a positive dividend response to JGTRRA seems the least
likely outcome based on the monitoring benefits models, but it cannot be ruled out. As
for constrained firms not making distributions prior to the tax changes, the monitoring
benefits model also would not predict initiations.
In contrast, under the old view, firms currently paying dividends, repurchasing
stock, or both would be expected to increase or initiate dividends. In addition, firms not
already making distributions, but accumulating surplus cash after funding I*, would also
be more likely to initiate a dividend as the marginal tax cost of increasing dividends in
equation (3.11) is reduced and the marginal benefit is increased. Truly constrained firms,
funding the marginal investment with new, outside capital would not be expected to
initiate a dividend, even under the old view. Overall, only under the old view would one
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expect to find both increased payments by firms already paying a dividend and increased
initiations.
Finally, one non-tax parameter where the predicted dividend response to changes
differs across the models is ρ, the rate of time preference. Exogenous changes in ρ (i.e. a
higher or lower ρ for all levels of dividend payouts) would be expected to reduce
dividends under the old view due to reduced marginal benefits of dividend payments, but
because dividends are a residual payment under the other models and higher ρ would tend
to reduce investment, the monitoring benefits model predicts an increase in dividends
while the new view predicts an increase once the repurchase constraint binds. An
exogenous change in time preferences could result, for example, from changes in the risk
free interest rate or from changes in the risk premium required of equity investments in
general.
Tax Policy Variables Definitions
Tests of the predictions reflected in Table 6 require an indicator variable for the
“treated” periods after passage of JGTRRA. In addition, though primary interest is in the
effects of JGTRRA, with a large relative reduction in dividend tax rates, it is also
necessary to control for the smaller relative change from the reduction of top capital gains
rates under TRA97. These dummy variables, including one alternate specification of the
JGTRRA treatment, are defined as follows:


JGTRRA. Equals one for all fiscal years ending after October 27, 2003, thus
including all fiscal years at least half of which occurred after passage, and over
nine months of which occurred after proposal, of the JGTRRA dividend tax cuts.



JGTRRA Alt. Equals one for all fiscal years ending after July 7, 2003, thus
including all fiscal years at least half of which occurred after proposal of the
JGTRRA dividend tax cuts.
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TRA97. Equals one for all fiscal years ending after December 31, 1997, thus
including all fiscal years at least six months of which occurred after TRA97’s
introduction in Congress and almost eight months after the retroactive effective
date.
Predicted Effects of Additional Variables
In addition to the main hypotheses above, theory, survey evidence, and past

empirical work suggest effects one should expect to find from the various control
variables and instruments on dividend and investment decisions. These variables are
defined, and predictions with regard to their effects are discussed below, beginning with
the internal source of funds for investment and distributions to shareholders.

Earnings
Surveys, theory, and intuition all suggest that dividends are increasing in profits,
all else the same, though surveys predict and empirical studies since Lintner (1956) find
that firms increase dividends only slowly over time in response to higher earnings and are
reluctant to reduce them in response to lower earnings. The notion in some theoretical
models of dividends as residual payments would suggest a coefficient closer to one,
controlling for investment and other factors, than one might expect from a partial
adjustment process. Accounting earnings, of course, do not measure economic profits or
even cash flows, so net income and an alternative measure of earnings, both scaled by
total assets, are used as follows:


Net Income. The accounting profits of the firm after interest, taxes, and all
extraordinary or non-recurring charges and gains.



Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (“EBITDA”).
The cash operating profit of the firm, before financing and other non-operating
costs; income from operations plus non-cash operating expenses.
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Investment
Investment is often omitted as an explanatory variable in the empirical literature
(Blouin, Raedy, and Shackleford 2004; Chetty and Saez 2005) or included only as a
lagged variable (Moser 2007), but as a competing use of firm cash flows, current period
investment should not be omitted. The relationship between firm investment and
dividend policies is a key difference between the old and new views of dividend taxation,
or more generally between theories where dividends and investment are simultaneously
determined, and those where dividends are a residual. Under the view of dividends as a
residual payment, one would expect investment to be negatively related to dividends,
after controlling for other sources of cash, with a coefficient approaching one if dividends
are purely a residual payment. On the other hand, simultaneous determination of
dividends and investment would suggest no direct dependence, though possibly mutual
correlation with other factors. However, while surveys suggest dividend-paying firms
will raise new external funds to finance investment rather than cutting dividends, they
also suggest that dividend initiations and increases do depend on whether the firm has
unmet profitable investment opportunities.
Even under the old view, constrained firms with unmet profitable investment
opportunities would not be expected to pay dividends. On the other hand, while the
payout decisions of unconstrained firms do not depend on investment, investment would
be positively affected by dividend payouts as the cost of capital is theorized to be a partial
function of dividend policy. Optimal investment would thus depend in part on the payout
and would be endogenous. For this reason, three aggregate economic indicators, interest
rate measures, lagged investment, and depreciation charges serve as instruments. Interest
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rates included are trailing 12-month averages as of the firm’s fiscal year-end so as to
reflect average interest rate conditions over the year; real 1-year and nominal 10-year
rates, are tested. The firm-level measure of investment and the candidates for
instruments are as follows:


Capital Expenditures (“CAPEX”). Expenditures for the purchase or improvement
of plant and equipment, reported on firms’ statements of cash flows. This
variable is scaled by dividing by total assets.



Lagged CAPEX.



Depreciation. GAAP accounting depreciation of fixed assets, also scaled by total
assets.



University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (“UMCSI”)



Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 50-state leading index (“Philly Fed Index”)



Federal Reserve Board capacity utilization rate (“CU Rate”)



Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 1-year real interest rate estimates, 12-month
moving average (“Real Rate”)16



10-year Constant Maturity Treasury rate, 12-month moving average (“CMT 10year”)17

Cash
Though not explicitly included in the theoretical models, cash reserves
accumulated from past earnings retentions or past securities issuance can be used to fund
investment or to smooth dividends in periods when current earnings will not fully fund
both. Agency theory, addressing the principle-agent conflict between shareholder and
managers, suggests that dividends and share repurchases are a means of removing surplus

16

Estimates of real interest rates are published monthly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and can
be downloaded from http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/inflation_expectations/.
17

Treasury rates are published by the Federal Reserve Board in Release H.15 and can be downloaded from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
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cash from the discretion of managers, thus providing benefits to shareholders that are,
under the old view, another possible justification for modeling the discount rate as a
partial function of dividends. Chetty and Saez (2007, 2010) explicitly model beginning
cash balances in their agency model, predicting “cash rich” firms will increase dividends
in response to a dividend tax cut, and that such a tax cut will cause some firms to shift to
the very high cash regime and initiate dividends. Thus a larger cash position, ceteris
paribus, is expected to be associated with dividend increases and initiations, and to
reduce the likelihood or size of dividend reductions in the event of declining earnings.
The cash balances variable, measured as of the prior year-end, is defined as follows:


Cash and Equivalents (“Cash”). Cash and highly liquid, short-term securities
readily convertible into known amounts of cash. Scaled by dividing by total
assets.

Debt
Debt finance is also not explicitly modeled, but the ability to borrow may work
similarly to cash in enabling firms to smooth dividends over time. On the other hand, the
terms of corporate debt sometimes include covenants restricting the borrower’s ability to
pay dividends under certain conditions. In addition, very high levels of debt, especially
debt that must soon be repaid, may constrain firms’ ability to fund new investment, or
drive up firms’ cost of both debt and equity capital due to bankruptcy risk, reducing the
amounts of new investment projects that would be profitable. The debt measures, for
which no prediction is made with regard to the sign of the coefficient, are also measured
as of the prior year-end and include:


Debt in Current Liabilities (“Current Debt”). Borrowings due within one year,
reported in current liabilities. Scaled by total assets.
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Total Long-Term Debt (“LT Debt”). All debt due in more than one year. Also
scaled by total assets.

Firm Maturity
Firm maturity, in the sense the term is used in the theory, describes the stage of
development of the firm from infancy to the mature stage where it might be expected to
initiate dividend payments. However, firm age (a reliable measure of which is not
available, anyway) is not necessarily a good measure of firm maturity as the time it takes
for firms to reach the mature stage varies widely from industry to industry and firm to
firm. In addition, mature, dividend-paying firms may, because of setbacks or because of
new investment opportunities, exit the mature stage for a time, terminating dividends.
Under Sinn’s (1991a, 1991b) nucleus theory, firms advance to the mature stage
after some period of funding all investment through earnings retentions, eventually
reaching the point where the marginal investment project just returns the cost of capital
and surplus earnings become available for distribution. This suggests that accumulated
earnings retentions relative to total assets or total capital might proxy for firm maturity as
an explanatory variable for the initiation or payment of dividends. The accumulation of
cash reserves, as already discussed, might be an alternative measure. The proxy for firm
maturity used here, measured as of the prior year-end, is the following:


Retained Earnings to Total Common Equity (“RE/CEQ”). The accumulated,
undistributed profits divided by the total common equity (proceeds of past
common stock issuance plus retained earnings, less past repurchases) of the firm.
A higher value indicates greater maturity.

Individual Ownership
Though imperfect, one less the institutional ownership percentage is a rough
measure of ownership by individuals who are more likely to be affected by shareholder
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taxes. This measure has been widely used in the literature as a control or as a means to
try to identify a tax effect, including by Auerbach and Hassett (2007), Blouin, Raedy, and
Shackleford (2004, 2007), and Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li (2007). In addition, Short, Zhang,
and Keasey (2002) investigated the link between institutional ownership and dividend
payouts for a sample of U.K. firms, finding a positive relationship. Individual or noninstitutional ownership is included in some regressions as a control variable and in others
is also interacted with the post-TRA97 and post-JGTRRA dummy variables. If payouts
respond to the tax changes as predicted by the old view, the interaction term would be
expected to be positive, reflecting a larger (in absolute value) dividend response to the tax
changes by firms with higher individual ownership. The individual ownership variable,
measured as of the latest report at the prior year-end, is defined as follows:


Individual Ownership Pct. One minus the institutional holdings percent of
outstanding shares as reported by the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings
(13F) Database.

Other Controls
To account for the possibility of industry-specific effects – dividend practices that
are consistent over time within an industry, but which may differ across industries – some
regressions include industry dummies based on 2-digit NAICS codes.
Finally, as discussed above, several indicator variables are also included to test for
possible bias resulting from attrition – either an entry into the data set as a result of an
initial public offering (“IPO”) or spin-off transaction after 1993, or an exit prior to 2009
for any of the reasons described in Table 5. The entry flag may also serve as an indicator
of firm immaturity, but firms entering as a result of a spin-off, and even some entering as
a result of an IPO, may be relatively mature firms. An additional dummy variable
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indicates periods during which a firm was in bankruptcy proceedings. If pre-bankruptcy
common shares are cancelled as a result of a reorganization plan or liquidation, the firm
is dropped as of the last report before reorganization or liquidation, with the exit flagged
like any other exit. If, on the other hand, the firm successfully reorganizes with prebankruptcy shareholders receiving a partial or full recovery (that is, existing shares are
not cancelled), the firm is retained. In either case, the periods the firm was operating in
bankruptcy, from filing to exit from bankruptcy proceedings, are flagged separately.
These variables are defined as follows:


Entry Flag. Equals one in fiscal year the firm is first publicly traded, if not
publicly traded before FY 1993.



Exit Flag. Equals one in fiscal year of final report as a public company if before
FY 2009.



Bankruptcy Flag. Equals one in periods during which the firm was operating
subject to a bankruptcy proceeding.

Summary
For convenience, Table 7 summarizes the predictions with regard to the various
control variables as positive (+), negative (-), no effect (0), or unclear. See Table 6 for
the tax policy dummy variables, TRA97 and JGTRRA.
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Table 7. Summary of Control Variable Coefficient Predictions.

Variable (category)
Earnings
old view
new view / monitoring ben.
Cash
Debt
Firm Maturity
Individual Ownership Percent
IO pct *JGTRRA1
old view
IO pct *TRA971
old view
Entry Flag
Exit Flag
Bankruptcy Flag
Investment
old view
new view / monitoring ben.
Interest Rates
old view
new view / monitoring ben.
Depreciation
Economic Indicators2

Dependent Variable
Payer (binary)
Dividends
+
+ (< 1)
+
1
+
+
uncl.

uncl.

+

+

uncl.

uncl.

+
–
0/–
0
–
–/0
–
–
+

+
–
0/–
0
–
– (> –1)
–1
–
+

CAPEX
+
uncl.

–
–

+
0
–

–
+
+

1. JGTRRA payout predictions relative to TRA97 and TRA97 relative to the base period, pre-1997.
2. Includes UMCSI, Philly Fed Index, and CU Rate.
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CHAPTER VIII
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Preliminary Observations
Before presenting the regression results, it is worth reviewing what can be readily
observed from the preliminary data in Chapter III about the dividend policy choices of
U.S. firms over recent decades, before and after passage of JGTRRA.


The percentage of publicly-traded companies that pay regular dividends had been
generally in decline since at least 1980, but this trend reversed in 2003.



Real per share dividend payments by S&P 1500 firms, which had been flat from
1994 to mid-2003, rose by 4.4 percent annually from then through 2011, even
after dropping sharply during the recent recession.



The average number of dividend initiations by S&P 1500 firms after passage of
JGTRRA through 2011 was nearly triple the average of the prior 35 quarters.
Average quarterly terminations rose by only 18 percent, including the spike
during the 2007-2009 recession.



The average net number of S&P 1500 firms increasing dividends each quarter
rose over the same time from 110 to 126, again in spite of a spike in reductions
late in the recent recession.

The sample data, including only S&P 1500 non-financial firms as of December 31, 2002
as described in Chapter VII, exhibits similar patterns with regard to dividend payers and
payments. Figures 9-10 show, by firm fiscal year, the percent of sample firms paying
dividends, and the number of firms initiating or terminating dividends, respectively.
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Figure 9. Percentage of Sample Firms Paying Common Dividends, by firm fiscal
year.
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Figure 10. Common Dividend Initiations and Terminations by Sample Firms,
by firm fiscal year.
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Regression Results
With these things in mind, we move on to testing whether the data supports one or
another theory’s predictions, and whether the observed changes in firm behavior since
2003 can be attributed to enactment of JGTRRA.

Probit Models
Table 9 presents the probit and IV probit regressions results, first without CAPEX
or the LDV (model 1). Model 2 adds the LDV, CAPEX (treated as exogenous), and the
Real Rate. Models 3-5 instrument for CAPEX with lagged CAPEX, depreciation, the
three economic indicators – the Philly Fed Index, UMCSI, and CU Rate – and in model
5, the Real Rate. Models 3 and 4 differ only in how the coefficient standard errors are
estimated – using jackknife standard errors, clustering first on industry (2-digit NAICS
codes) and then year to allow for residual correlations across firms in broad industry
groups or common shocks across the cross-section of firms each year. Model 5 adds the
individual ownership percent, interactions of individual ownership with the tax policy
dummy variables, and the maturity proxy, RE / CEQ.
For each model, the hypothesis that the coefficients on the JGTRRA and TRA97
dummy variables (pre-1997 is the base) are equal is tested. Except for model 4, where
the p-value is 0.105, and model 5, where the interaction terms are included, the test
shows differences (JGTRRA > TRA97) that are significant at the 1 percent level. In
models 1-4, coefficient estimates for JGTRRA range from 0.046 to 0.083, compared to
-0.14 to -0.18 for the period when TRA97 governed (or zero in the pre-1997 base period).
Though not identical models, these results are consistent with the probit results over a
much shorter period from Chetty and Saez (2004). The coefficient estimate on the
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JGTRRA*Individual Ownership interaction term, positive and significant at the 1 percent
level, indicates that the effect of the JGTRRA tax changes is increasing in individual
ownership, as predicted.
Including the LDV and CAPEX greatly increased the explanatory power of the
model, reducing the classification errors from almost 1/3 in model 1 to fewer than 4
percent in model 2. In models 1-4, higher profitability or return on assets (Net Income /
Assets) has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of paying a dividend while
higher CAPEX / Assets has a significant negative effect, suggesting that firms growing
their assets more quickly (investment relative to existing assets) are less likely to initiate
a dividend. Neither result is surprising, of course. Estimates for the two debt variables
(current and long-term) are also not surprising as, except for model 1, all are negative and
generally statistically significant. The only surprise is that greater liquidity – higher cash
balances relative to total assets – is associated with a lower probability of paying a
dividend. It may be that larger relative cash balances are often held by less mature firms
because financial capital-raising is lumpy and balances are held for future investment
needs. Regressions including the lagged change in cash balances or a lagged cash flow
measure (EBITDA) showed a significant positive effect on payment of dividends, but
results for other variables were not materially different, so those results are omitted.
Finally, while the coefficient estimates on the Real Rate in models 2-4 are large and
negative, the standard errors are even larger. Dropping Real Rate from the second stage
equation, but retaining it as an instrument, had little impact on estimates for the other
variables.
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Regarding the suspected endogeneity of CAPEX, a Wald test of the null
hypothesis that CAPEX can be treated as exogenous is reported with models 3-5, the
results significant at the 1 percent level, rejecting the null.

OLS and 2SLS Models
Turning next to the linear models of dividend payments, OLS and 2SLS results
are presented in Table 10. Models 1 and 2 are OLS, the latter adding lagged dividends
and calculating standard errors clustered on year rather than industry. Models 3
instruments for CAPEX and substitutes Driscol-Kraay standard error estimates, which are
robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary common autocorrelation, but is otherwise
comparable to model 2 and produces essentially the same results. Models 4 adds the
entry and bankruptcy flags, and the Real Rate while model 5 adds the individual
ownership and maturity variables, both estimated with heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation robust Newey-West errors.
Results for the tax regime dummies are essentially the same between comparable
OLS and 2SLS models, but estimated coefficients are smaller in magnitude in LDV
models where the coefficient on JGTRRA is not statistically different from zero. As in
the probit models, tests for equality between coefficients on JGTRRA and TRA97
consistently reject the null. The estimates from the LDV models suggest that, controlling
for other observable financial characteristics of firms as well as past dividend policies,
dividends as a percent of assets post-JGTRRA have returned to levels before passage of
TRA97 and were about 21-23 basis points lower in the interim, TRA97 period. This may
seem small, but it is actually quite large compared to the historical unconditional mean of
Dividends / Assets, which is 1.31 percent over the entire 1994-2009 period.
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The coefficients on Net Income and CAPEX tell a similar story with regard to
dividend payments as payers, with higher levels of each having significant, offsetting
effects on payments. With coefficient estimates ranging from about 0.022 to 0.024 in
2SLS regressions, a one percentage point increase in the return on assets – net income to
assets – implies a 2.2 to 2.4 basis point increase in the dividend return on assets.
Substituting EBITDA for net income in model 3, the coefficient estimate on EBITDA is
0.039 (also significant at the 1 percent level) with other coefficient estimates essentially
unchanged. Higher CAPEX, meanwhile, has a somewhat smaller negative effect on
dividend payouts with a one percentage point increase in CAPEX / Assets implying a 1.5
to 1.6 basis point decrease in dividend returns.
Cash and long-term debt exhibit no significant effects on dividend payouts in the
linear models, unlike the probit models, while higher levels of current debt appear to be
associated with higher payouts. It may simply be that public companies with greater
access to short-term borrowing – e.g. commercial paper – tend to be more mature firms
and thus more likely to pay dividends.
In model 4, the Real Rate coefficient estimate is positive and significant,
consistent with predictions under the new view and monitoring benefits models. The
entry and bankruptcy flags both showed significant negative effects on dividend payouts,
consistent with expectations. Regressions were also run with the exit flag; estimates were
very small and not statistically different from zero, and results for other variables were
essentially the same as without the exit flag. In model 5, individual ownership, is
positively associated with dividend payouts while the firm maturity proxy is statistically
significant, but exceedingly small.
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Finally, a regression otherwise the same as model 3 was run including industry
sector dummy variables, grouping by 2-digit NAICS codes, but coefficient estimates for
the other variables were not materially different than model 3 results and the dummies
added little explanatory power to the model, so these results are omitted.

Tobit Corner Solution Models
As noted in the empirical issues discussion in Chapter VII, more than 45 percent
of firm-year observations show zero dividends, suggesting that a linear model may be
inconsistent and that a corner solution model is more appropriate. Table 11 presents the
results of instrumental variable Tobit regressions, beginning with LDV models that differ
first in the estimation of standard errors – jackknife standard errors, clustering on industry
in the case of model 1 and year for model 2, with little difference in the standard error
estimates. Model 3 is the same as model 2 except for the inclusion of the Real Rate and
industry sector dummies (the dummy variable coefficient estimates are not reported).
Model 4 again adds the entry and bankruptcy flags and model 5 adds the individual
ownership percent and interaction terms.
In all models except the final one, which includes the individual ownership
interaction terms, the difference between the JGTRRA and TRA97 coefficient estimates
is statistically significant at the one percent level. Estimates for JGTRRA are statistically
zero, as in the linear models, but for TRA97, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is
considerably larger, ranging from -0.0041 to -0.0053 in models 1-4, and significant at
least at the 10 percent level and generally better than the 5 percent level. In the final
model, the Individual Ownership interaction terms both show a significant positive
relationship between individual ownership and payouts during the TRA97 and JGTRRA
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periods, but the coefficients on the tax policy dummy variables are no longer significantly
different from one another. Adding only the individual ownership percent to model 4,
without interaction terms, produces results similar to those of model 4, with a roughly 66
basis point difference between the JGTRRA and TRA97 dummy variables coefficients
that is again significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient estimate on individual
ownership is 0.014, also significant at the 1 percent level (these results are not reported in
the table). However, a problem with including individual ownership (and the interaction
terms) is that this variable is not available for all firms or periods, resulting in
substantially fewer observations. In addition, there may be data or measurement
problems as some firms show reported institutional ownership in excess of 100 percent,
perhaps resulting from large short positions due to arbitrage activities, so these results
should be interpreted with caution.
On average, the coefficient estimates of around a 50 basis points suggest a
significant increase, ceteris paribus, in dividends / assets in the JGTRRA period versus
the TRA97 period compared to the mean payout since 1994 of about 1.3 percent of assets
annually.18
Net Income, CAPEX, and cash coefficient estimates in the Tobit models are also
considerably larger in magnitude than in the 2SLS models and are generally significant at
the 1 percent level. Unlike in the 2SLS models, net income and CAPEX have roughly
offsetting effects, with 1 percentage point higher return on assets adding about 7.5 to 8.8
basis points to the dividend return and 1 percentage point higher CAPEX/Assets reducing

18

Note that the Tobit coefficient estimates should not be interpreted as marginal effects on the observed
dividend variable, but rather on the latent variable that is not observed unless greater than zero.
Unfortunately, marginal effects on the observed (censored and uncensored) payout (or only for uncensored
observations) could not be calculated using Stata and thus are not reported.
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dividend returns by 7.3 to 9.7 basis points. Note that, though significantly non-zero,
these estimates are far from the values implied by the notion of dividends as a residual
payment, 1 and -1, respectively.
Adding the Real Rate and the sector dummies in model 3 has little impact on the
estimates for other variables and while the estimate for the Real Rate is again positive, it
is not statistically significant. In model 4, the entry and bankruptcy flags, both negative
and statistically significant, suggest 4-5 percentage point lower dividend returns for
newly public firms and firms operating in bankruptcy, all else the same. Neither result is
surprising, of course. Lastly, Wald tests of the exogeneity of CAPEX once again
consistently reject the null at the one percent level of significance.

Robustness Checks and Other Variables Not Reported
Additional probit, 2SLS, and Tobit regressions were run including other variables
described in Chapter VII to test predictions or to check the robustness of the reported
estimates. Additional regressions included alternate market interest rate measures such as
the 10-year Treasury rate; unfortunately, no market interest rate measure showed a
consistent and statistically significant effect in dividend regressions, whether in a Payer
or Dividend Payment model. A consistent and significant negative effect would have
tended to support the old view while a positive effect would have been consistent with
either the new view or the monitoring benefits model.
Exit flags, included to test for potential attrition bias, and a time index were never
significant, and while the entry and bankruptcy flags were usually significant, including
them had no material effect on the results for the variables of interest or the conclusions
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drawn. Inclusion of industry effects with the NAICS-based dummy variables also had no
material impact on results for other variables.
Finally, regressions were run with the alternate specification of the JGTRRA
dummy variable, shifting the “treated” period roughly five months earlier. This, too, had
no material effect on the results.

CAPEX Regressions
The endogeneity of CAPEX in dividend models is generally supported by the test
results noted above, so instrumental variable methods are called for, but the first stage
regressions are of interest in their own right because of theoretical and policy questions
about the effects of personal taxation on business capital investment. Table 12 presents
some OLS results from regressions of CAPEX / Assets first on only the instruments
excluded from the second stage dividend equations and then adding the primary set of
second stage regressors, including the financial and tax policy variables. The excluded
instruments, again, are lagged CAPEX / Assets, Depreciation / Assets, the three
economic indicators, and the real rate of interest. In the actual first stage regressions for
the IV estimates, other instruments were tested, including substituting nominal interest
rate measures, but with little effect on the results. Models 1 and 3 use clustered standard
errors, clustering on industry, while models 2 and 4 use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors,
accounting for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary common autocorrelation. Model
5 is the same as model 4 except for the substitution of EBITDA for net income.
The lagged CAPEX and depreciation variables, unsurprisingly, have large,
positive, and statistically significant effects. The capacity utilization rate is also
consistently positive and significant while the Philly Fed Index is also positive, but only
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significant in models 1 and 2. The Real Rate is not statistically significant in any of the
regressions, but at least the sign is negative as expected. Other interest rate measures
produced no better results. In models 3 and4, lagged dividends are negative and
significant while net income is positive and significant, with the estimate for the two
variables having similar magnitudes. Substituting EBITDA in model 5 produces similar
results.
Of particular interest, estimates on the tax policy variables show significantly
lower CAPEX during the TRA97 tax regime by about 0.6 percent of assets, compared to
the base period and by over 0.3 percent of assets compared to the post-JGTRRA period.
For all firm-year observations, the mean value of CAPEX / Assets is about 7.2 percent, so
the point estimate of 0.6 percent is relatively large, about 8 percent of the mean value.
The point estimate of -0.16 to -0.25 percent for JGTRRA suggests lower relative levels of
investment since 2003 compared to pre-1997, but the estimate is not statistically
significant in any model, while the TRA97 estimate is significant at the 5 percent or 1
percent level in all three. Considering that the post-JGTRRA data run through fiscal
2009 (fiscal years ending between June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2010) and thus severe
recession for most or all of the last two years of firm data, a slightly negative point
estimate on the JGTRRA dummy variable is not surprising. The included variables can’t
fully account for the effects of the financial crisis on access to new financial capital or the
negative outlook likely suppressing firms’ appetites for new investment. The large
negative coefficient on TRA97, compared to JGTRRA, is consistent with the predictions
of all three modeled theories and with the predictions of proponents of the JGTRRA in
2003. The difference of 0.33 to 0.44 percentage points between the JGTRRA and
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TRA97 estimates is significant in models 4 and 5 at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels,
respectively, and represents about a 5 to 6 percent positive swing in mean CAPEX /
Assets between the TRA97 and JGTRRA periods, ceteris paribus.
Summary of Findings
The findings of the regression models with regard to the policy change variables,
and the firm-specific financial and other variables are summarized below in Table 8 for
convenience in comparing results to predictions in Tables 6 and 7. For detailed results,
see Tables 9-12 on the following pages. The primary findings of interest are summarized
by the following points:


The endogeneity of capital expenditures in dividend payer or payment amount
regressions is supported by consistent test results. Instrumenting for CAPEX,
results indicate that investment is indeed a significant factor in dividend decisions
of firms, but coefficient estimates are far from the -1 value implied by theories
that treat dividends as a residual payment and are more consistent with the old
view predictions.



Income measures also clearly influence dividend payouts, but again not to the
extent expected if dividends are merely residual payments.



Large, positive coefficient estimates on lagged dividends are consistent with the
survey evidence and past empirical evidence of dividend smoothing, and the
notion of signaling benefits as assumed by the old view and the vast majority of
surveyed managers.



Coefficient estimates and tests consistently find a significant increase in both
dividend payers and payments after passage of JGTRRA compared to the period
governed by TRA97, ceteris paribus, returning dividend payments as a percent of
assets to pre-TRA97 levels.



Regression results also provide evidence of a statistically and economically
significant increase in firm investment during the period since passage of
JGTRRA, controlling for firm financial characteristics and other investmentrelated factors.
Identification of the policy effect, however, is subject to the possibility that some

other, unobserved factor explains the increases in dividend payers and payments after
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passage of JGTRRA and thus the correlations with the policy dummy variables may be
spurious. The use of individual ownership data, interacted with the policy dummy
variables, provided some support for the policy change driving dividend initiations (i.e. in
the IV Probit model) and dividend payment amounts appear to be increasing in
ownership by individual investors. However, the ownership data do not truly measure
taxable versus non-taxable ownership as both individuals and institutions may fall in
either category. In addition, ownership data are unavailable for many firms and, in other
cases, reported institutional ownership is in excess of 100 percent (thus measured
individual ownership is negative), raising concerns about errors in the data. In any case,
including the interaction terms in the Tobit dividend payment model muddled the results,
so identification remains an issue.
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis presented here spans 16 years of business
activity, two recessions, and two relevant tax policy changes where previous studies of
the effects of JGTRRA have focused on a much shorter period around passage. In
addition, this analysis models payment amounts as well as binary payment decision, and
accounts for the interdependence between dividend and investment decisions where
others have generally analyzed them separately. Finally, this analysis addresses
empirical issues inherent to the dividend decisions of firms – particularly the censored or
corner-solution nature of the firm’s optimization problem – with appropriate methods.
While it does not find neat answers to some questions and opportunities to refine the
analysis surely abound, overall, the results are consistent with the effects advertised by
JGTRRA proponents and with the old view theoretical model as far as its prediction that
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a dividend tax cut would tend to increase both dividend distributions to shareholders and
firm capital investment, all else the same.
Table 8. Summary of Regression Results.

Variable (category)
JGTRRA1
TRA971
Lagged Dependent Variables
Earnings
CAPEX
Cash
Debt
Firm Maturity (RE/CEQ)
Individual Ownership Percent
Individual Ownership*JGTRRA
Individual Ownership*TRA97
Entry Flag
Exit Flag
Bankruptcy Flag
Interest Rates
Depreciation
Economic Indicators2

Dependent Variable
Payer (binary)
Dividends
+
+
–
–
+
+
+
+ (<1)
–
– (> -1)
–
+
uncl.
–
0
0
+/uncl.
0
+/uncl.
+
0
weak –

CAPEX
+
–
+
+
–

–

+/uncl.

0
–

–
0
–

uncl.

uncl.

uncl./weak –

+
+

1. JGTRRA payout predictions relative to TRA97 and TRA97 relative to the base period, pre-1997.
2. Includes UMCSI, Philly Fed Index, and CU Rate.
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Table 9. Preliminary Probit Regressions.
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payer
Method: Probit1
Probit1
IV Probit2,3 IV Probit2,4 IV Probit2,4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Lagged Dep Var
3.6371 *** 3.6716 *** 3.6716 *** 3.7036 ***
JGTRRA
TRA97

(0.071)

(0.090)

(0.077)

(0.086)

0.0833 *

0.0484

0.0459

0.0459

-0.0700

(0.043)

(0.050)

(0.065)

(0.119)

(0.142)

-0.1426 *** -0.1647 *** -0.1791 *** -0.1791 *
(0.038)

Net Income / Assets

(0.161)

1.9967
(1.233)

(0.362)

(0.656)

-0.7327 *

-1.2116 *

(0.422)

(0.622)

(0.877)

-1.2116 **
(0.515)

-1.0866 *
(0.569)

-3.1948 *** -1.2224 *** -1.1304 *** -1.1304 *** -1.0063 ***
1.1111 **
(0.480)

LT Debt / Assets

(0.102)

(0.216)

(0.285)

Current Debt / Assets

(0.058)

1.2445 *** 1.7199 *** 2.0253 *** 2.0253 **

CAPEX / Assets
Cash / Assets

(0.039)

-0.2816

-0.3119 *
(0.184)

Real Rate

(0.205)

-1.1684 **
(0.470)

(0.267)

-1.0891 **
(0.489)

-0.3633 *** -0.3411 *

(0.223)

(0.261)

-1.0891 *

-0.9146 *

(0.578)

(0.511)

-0.3411 **

(0.131)

(0.190)

(0.119)

-2.0705

-2.1429

-2.1429

(2.147)

(2.534)

(7.220)

Individual Ownership Pct.

-0.2808 **
(0.134)

-0.1992
(0.248)

JGTRRA*Indiv. Ownership

0.8012 ***
(0.265)

TRA97*Indiv. Ownership

0.3479
(0.343)

RE / CEQ

0.0003
(0.004)

Constant

0.5096 *** -1.4567 *** -1.4815 *** -1.4815 *** -1.5344 ***
(0.116)

(0.077)

(0.112)

(0.183)

(0.154)

Obs
17,255
17,255
16,118
16,118
13,157
Pseudo R-squared
0.1107
0.7963
F-test: JGTRRA=TRA97
52.25 *** 31.29 *** 33.02 ***
3.01
1.42
Wald Chi-sq test of exogeneity
9.32 ***
9.32 ***
6.72 ***
Pct. Correctly Classified
68%
97%
Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
1. Robust SEs, clustered on industry (2-digit NAICS). 2. Newey's two-step estimator, CAPEX/Assets
treated as endogenous. Instruments include lagged CAPEX/Assets, Depr/Assets, Philly Fed Index,
UMCSI, CU Rate, and Real Rate. 3. Jackknife SEs, clustering on industry. 4. Jackknife SEs, clustering on
year.
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Table 10. OLS ans 2SLS Regressions.
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payments / Assets
Method:

OLS1
(1)

Lagged Dep Var
JGTRRA

Cash / Assets
Current Debt / Assets
LT Debt / Assets

2SLS3,5
(5)
0.6061 ***

(0.089)

(0.107)

-0.0027 *** -0.0004

-0.0005

0.0001

0.0011

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.0052 *** -0.0022 **
0.0191
(0.012)

CAPEX / Assets

2SLS3,5
(4)
0.4866 ***

(0.080)

(0.001)

Net Income / Assets

2SLS3,4
(3)
0.4865 ***

(0.107)
(0.001)

TRA97

OLS2
(2)
0.4869 ***

-0.0123

(0.001)

0.0237 **
(0.001)

-0.0136 **

-0.0023 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0014 **
(0.001)

0.0239 **
(0.011)

(0.001)

0.0236 ***
(0.009)

(0.001)

0.0213 **
(0.009)

-0.0163 *** -0.0146 *** -0.0151 ***

(0.009)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

-0.0077

0.0003

0.0002

0.0011

0.0040

(0.006)

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

0.0242 *

0.0117 **

0.0114 ***

0.0119 ***

0.0087 **

(0.014)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.0011

0.0058

0.0057

0.0059

0.0082

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.013)

Real Rate

0.0571 **
(0.025)

Entry Flag

-0.0116 ***
(0.002)

Bankruptcy Flag

-0.0058 **
(0.002)

Individual Ownership Pct.

0.0045 **
(0.002)

RE / CEQ

0.0000 **
(0.000)

Constant

0.0162 ***
(0.002)

0.0058

0.0060

0.0048

0.0012

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

Obs
17,255
16,118
R-squared (centered)
0.0232
0.2448
F-test: JGTRRA=TRA97
18.95 *** 10.32 ***
Sargan-Hansen test H 0: CAPEX exogenous
First stage R-squared
Kleibergen-Paap F test H 0: weak id

16,118
0.2448
12.29 ***
0.00
0.6019
189.77 ***

16,118
0.2471
24.14 ***
0.39
0.6031
153.08 ***

13,157
0.3428
30.53 ***
5.57 **
0.6426
344.84 ***

Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
1. Robust SEs clustered on industry (2-digit NAICS). 2. SEs clustered on fiscal year. 3. 2SLS estimated
using ivreg2 command (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2010), CAPEX/Assets treated as endogenous.
Instruments include lagged CAPEX/Assets, Depr/Assets, Philly Fed Index, UMCSI, CU Rate, and Real
Rate. 4. Driscol-Kraay SEs, robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary common autocorrelation. 5. HAC
robust Newey-West SEs.
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Table 11. Tobit Regressions. 1
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payments / Assets
Method: IV Tobit2
IV Tobit3 IV Tobit3,4
(1)
(2)
(3)
Lagged Dep Var
0.6751 *** 0.6751 *** 0.6356 ***
JGTRRA
TRA97

(0.147)

(0.161)

(0.159)

(0.158)

0.0002

0.0002

0.0015

-0.0006

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.0049 *** -0.0049 **
(0.001)

Net Income / Assets

0.0858 ***
(0.023)

CAPEX / Assets

LT Debt / Assets

0.0858 ***
(0.021)

-0.0041 *
(0.002)

0.0881 ***
(0.022)

-0.0053 **
(0.002)

0.0852 ***
(0.021)

(0.202)

-0.0133 ***
(0.003)

-0.0169 ***
(0.004)

0.0739 **
(0.029)

(0.013)

(0.016)

(0.012)

(0.015)

-0.0633 *** -0.0633 *** -0.0562 *** -0.0611 *** -0.0471 ***
(0.010)

Current Debt / Assets

(0.002)

IV Tobit3
(5)
0.7987 ***

0.0854 *** -0.0854 *** -0.0970 *** -0.0804 *** -0.0723 ***
(0.026)

Cash / Assets

IV Tobit3
(4)
0.6802 ***

0.0216

(0.011)

0.0216 **

(0.010)

0.0094

(0.010)

0.0236 **

(0.010)

0.0149

(0.014)

(0.009)

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.009)

0.0050

0.0050

-0.0020

0.0053

0.0098

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.019)

(0.017)

(0.020)

Real Rate

0.1006
(0.071)

Entry Flag

-0.0489 ***
(0.014)

Bankruptcy Flag

-0.0457 **
(0.017)

Individual Ownership Pct.

-0.0172 ***
(0.006)

JGTRRA*Indiv. Ownership

0.0404 ***
(0.010)

TRA97*Indiv. Ownership

0.0282 **
(0.010)

Constant
Obs
F-test: JGTRRA=TRA97
Wald test of exogeneity

-0.0035

-0.0035

0.0070

-0.0033

0.0017

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.015)

(0.008)

(0.008)

16,118
19.41 ***
41.08 ***

16,118
15.20 ***
41.08 ***

16,118
13.55 ***
32.32 ***

16,118
11.64 ***
33.04 ***

13,173
1.01
16.98 ***

Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
1. Newey's two-step estimator with CAPEX/Assets treated as endogenous. Instruments include lagged
CAPEX/Assets, Depr/Assets, Philly Fed Index, UMCSI, CU Rate, and Real Rate. 2. Jackknife SEs,
clustering on industry (2-digit NAICS). 3. Jackknife SEs, clustering on year. 4. Includes industry dummy
variables (not reported).
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Table 12. CAPEX Regressions. 1
Dependent Variable: CAPEX / Assets
Method:
Lagged Dep Var

OLS2
(1)
0.5202 ***
(0.062)

Depreciation / Assets

0.5234 ***
(0.127)

Philly Fed Index
UMCSI
CU Rate
Real Rate

0.0026 ***

OLS3
(2)
0.5202 ***
(0.058)

0.5234 ***
(0.125)

0.0026 ***

OLS2
(3)
0.4964 ***
(0.061)

0.6010 ***

OLS3
(4)
0.4964 ***
(0.055)

0.6010 ***

OLS3
(5)
0.5042 ***
(0.055)

0.4470 ***

(0.124)

(0.114)

(0.109)

0.0007

0.0007

0.0005

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.0001

-0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0015 ***

0.0015 ***

0.0013 ***

0.0013 ***

0.0011 ***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.0019

-0.0019

-0.0533

-0.0533

-0.0038

(0.077)

(0.091)

(0.044)

(0.067)

(0.069)

Lagged Dividends / Assets

-0.0623 *** -0.0623 *** -0.0791 ***

JGTRRA
TRA97

(0.018)

(0.022)

(0.027)

-0.0025

-0.0025

-0.0016

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.0058 **
(0.002)

Net Income / Assets

0.0791 ***
(0.015)

-0.0058 *** -0.0060 ***
(0.001)

(0.001)

0.0791 ***
(0.013)

EBITDA / Assets

0.0871 ***
(0.014)

Cash / Assets

-0.0109
(0.007)

Current Debt / Assets

-0.0310 **

LT Debt / Assets
Constant
Obs
R-squared (centered)
F-test: JGTRRA=TRA97

-0.0109 *** -0.0108 ***
(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.0310 *** -0.0312 ***

(0.013)

(0.007)

(0.007)

-0.0035

-0.0035

-0.0038

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

-0.1063 *** -0.1063 *** -0.1046 *** -0.1046 *** -0.0975 ***
(0.023)

(0.029)

(0.033)

16,118
0.5808

16,118
0.5808

16,118
0.6019
1.02

(0.021)

16,118
0.6019
5.25 **

(0.021)

16,118
0.6008
15.00 ***

Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
1. Instruments for IV regressions in italics. All equations estimated using ivreg2 command in Stata (Baum,
Schaffer, and Stillman 2010). 2. SEs clustered on industry (2-digit NAICS). 3. Driscol-Kraay SEs, robust to
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary common autocorrelation.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND
AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The theoretical portions of this project contribute to the literature and debate in
two ways. First, though the debate over the old view, the new view, and various agency
or other theories is long-running and unsettled, I believe it is useful to replicate existing
competing models in a consistent, robust framework to more easily compare their
assumptions and conclusions, and to more readily enhance them. The models presented
here replicate the standard new view model, a monitoring benefits model originally
presented as a two-period optimization problem, and also a variation on the old view
model. The framework is a continuous time dynamic optimization model that begins
with the new view model as a base, and then enhances it to replicate the monitoring
benefits and old view models. The framework eases the way toward the second
contribution, which is the application of the Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (1990)
endogenous discounting methodology to enhance the old view model and derive an Euler
condition for the optimum dividend policy of the firm.
The model might be further enhanced by incorporating other aspects of the realworld optimization problem corporations face, including, for example, cash reserves and
debt, bankruptcy risk, financial transaction costs, and some of the issues and ideas from
agency theory.
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The empirical analysis presented here also contributes to the literature on personal
taxation of corporate source income primarily from two perspectives. First, it addresses
several empirical issues that have gotten limited attention in previous studies of JGTRRA
and dividend taxation generally. In particular, with over 45 percent of firm-year
observations of dividend payments equal to zero, it is clear that standard linear methods
are not appropriate for estimating dividend payment models. Both the data and the theory
suggest a corner solution approach such as a Tobit model, yet such an approach has been
applied to this topic in the existing literature. Likewise the inclusion of firm investment
in dividend models: survey evidence and theory suggest that capital expenditures are at
least an important factor in dividend decisions, if not the direct determinant of dividends
as a residual payment as some theory holds. Other theory also holds that dividend policy
can impact the cost of capital and thus investment. Yet capital expenditures are rarely
included in empirical models of dividend behavior and when they are, their apparent
endogeneity is not addressed. This study addresses both of those issues, along with
several others that have been addressed in previous studies.
Second, though the results are not clear with regard to some questions, such as
how exogenous changes in shareholder return requirements might affect dividend policy,
or how cash reserves and debt might factor into dividend policy, they do provide
evidence of an effect of JGTRRA on dividend policy – both the number of firms paying
dividends and the amounts paid out – and also evidence that JGTRRA positively affected
business investment. These findings bear directly on the theoretical debate over how
dividend decisions are made and affected by taxes.
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Ideas to improve the analysis include, for example, using a rotating sample of
firms rather than a static sample that is subject to attrition, potential survivorship bias,
and other problems associated with using firm-level financial data. Additional useful
variables might also be identified, including other instruments for capital expenditures or
more reliable data on new share issuance, repurchases, and ownership. Ownership data
that more reliably measures taxable versus non-taxable ownership might help with
identification of a policy effect. Another identification strategy might be to expend the
analysis to include non-U.S. firms whose shareholders are not affected by U.S. tax
changes, but may have been affected by tax changes in their home countries.
Finally, the effects identified above of JGTRRA on dividend policy and business
investment are what proponents of JGTRRA predicted prior to its passage in 2003. With
current dividend and capital gains tax rates scheduled to expire at the end of this year,
and the former set to rise particularly sharply, worries over the consequences of the
expiration seem warranted. U.S. corporate tax rates are currently the highest among
OECD nations and a greatly expanded layer of personal taxes will soon be piled on top.
The answer is not necessarily to simply extend the JGTRRA tax treatment of dividends
and capital gains. The original proposal that became JGTRRA was for full integration of
corporate and personal taxes, with the objectives of encouraging business investment by
reducing the cost of equity capital and of making the tax system neutral with regard to
business financial decisions by removing disincentives to equity finance and the payment
of dividends. Amidst today’s slow economic growth and uncertainty about future tax
policy, consideration once again of income tax reforms with those same objectives seems
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in order. Economists and policy-makers need to focus more attention and effort on
capital income taxation and addressing this piece of the approaching fiscal cliff.
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APPENDIX A
DATA SUMMARY
Variable
Dividends/Assets

Dividend Payer

Net Income/Assets

EBITDA/Assets

CAPEX/Assets

Depreciation/Assets

Cash/Assets

*

Current Debt/Assets *

LT Debt/Assets

*

RE/CEQ

*

Indiv. Ownership Pct. *

UNCSI

*

Philly Fed Index

*

CU Rate

*

Real Rate

CMT 10-year

overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within

Mean Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Obs
0.0134
0.032
0.000
1.671 17,258
0.019
0.000
0.269
0.025
-0.135
1.553
0.5469
0.498
0.000
1.000 17,469
0.446
0.000
1.000
0.224
-0.391
1.484
0.0579
0.187 -16.459
3.348 17,258
0.076
-1.123
0.458
0.171 -15.278
3.122
0.1711
0.184 -16.202
2.776 17,257
0.094
-1.052
0.843
0.158 -14.978
2.683
0.0732
0.084
0.000
3.315 17,258
0.056
0.002
0.446
0.063
-0.307
2.993
0.0504
0.036
0.000
1.530 17,257
0.027
0.002
0.436
0.024
-0.134
1.368
0.1373
0.172
-0.002
0.950 17,476
0.150
0.002
0.805
0.086
-0.350
0.832
0.0344
0.059
-0.040
1.295 17,473
0.037
0.000
0.401
0.046
-0.217
1.223
0.1878
0.168
0.000
2.616 17,476
0.132
0.000
0.816
0.106
-0.462
2.469
0.4832
19.074 -2098.04 1102.48 17,383
4.461 -130.941 58.687
18.499 -1966.62 1044.28
0.3392
0.218
-1.020
1.000 14,002
0.159
-0.160
1.000
0.159
-0.829
1.116
91.7748
10.818
55.300 112.000 17,476
1.974
81.363 98.514
10.676
55.116 116.005
1.0106
1.134
-2.865
2.483 17,476
0.183
0.327
1.403
1.122
-2.869
2.745
79.9515
3.690
67.052 85.041 17,476
0.681
76.216 80.669
3.647
67.351 85.781
0.0151
0.011
-0.008
0.029 17,469
0.001
0.004
0.018
0.011
-0.007
0.034
5.1244
1.062
3.159
7.442 17,469
0.227
4.178
5.635
1.044
3.150
7.498

* indicates lagged values
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Firms
1,194

Years
14.45

1,194

14.63

1,194

14.45

1,194

14.45

1,194

14.45

1,194

14.45

1,194

14.64

1,194

14.63

1,194

14.64

1,194

14.56

1,092

12.82

1,194

14.64

1,194

14.64

1,194

14.64

1,194

14.63

1,194

14.63
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